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Labor Organization in  
Ride-Sharing—Unionization  
or Cartelization? 
Mark Anderson & Max Huffman* 
ABSTRACT 
The sharing economy brings together the constituent parts of a 
business enterprise into a structure that, on its surface, resembles a 
business firm, but in crucial ways is nothing like the traditional firm. 
This includes the ownership of the primary capital assets used in the 
business, as well as one of the most fundamental features of a firm—the 
relationship with its labor force. Sharing economy workers are formally 
contractors, running small businesses as sole entrepreneurs, with the 
effect that they are excluded from many of the protections made available 
to workers across the economy. The result is a seeming disparity across 
the market, with consumers realizing benefits of choice and price that 
did not exist before and platforms possibly poised to turn profits as the 
hubs of massive enterprises with few of the burdens of a dependent 
workforce. 
This Article explains how existing antitrust law would not allow 
labor organization by sharing economy workers. Even under a possible 
Rule of Reason approach, the worker protection goals that underlie 
collective bargaining are not cognizable efficiency justifications for 
collective bargaining. However, this Article also shows that existing  
law ignores the well-developed economic theory that supports labor 
organization as a response to monopsony, and how that theory supports 
the idea of labor organization as having pro-consumer effects.   
This Article identifies two primary market structures—the 
fallow-assets model and the locked-in model—and shows how in the first 
 
 * Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Idaho College of Law; Professor of  
Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law. The Authors thank Pinar  
Akman, Eric Clark, Sebenzile Dlamini, Marina Lao, Eric Posner, Spencer W. Waller,  
participants in an Indiana-McKinney faculty colloquium, and participants in a University  
of Copenhagen-Copenhagen Business School competition law conference, for insights and  
suggestions. The Authors also thank Rachel Bondi, Ramon Ryan, and their colleagues for excellent 
editorial assistance. 
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structure the effect of organization would be to increase output in the 
labor market, leading to increased output and lower price in the 
consumer market, while in the second structure the effect of organization 
is likely to lead to harm in the consumer market. Outcome ambiguity 
and the novel enterprise structure militate for a Rule of Reason 
treatment of labor organization in ride-sharing. In operation, this 
produces the uncomfortable result that the workers least in need of labor 
protections are most likely to succeed in avoiding liability, while those 
most in need of protections are most likely to be subjected to damages 
and injunctions. As a result, non-antitrust labor protections remain 
essential. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The sharing economy reflects an extraordinary whole-cloth 
creation of social welfare, allowing a seemingly infinite range of fallow 
assets to be exchanged in welfare-enhancing transactions.1 Physical 
assets—cars, houses, bicycles, tools, couches—that previously were 
underutilized might now be the basis for economic exchange.2 Labor 
assets—individuals’ time and talent—that were underused, whether 
because of underemployment or because individuals felt their capacity 
extended beyond the traditional workweek, might now support that 
transaction.3 On the consumption side, those individuals previously 
excluded from the market might now transact as output of services 
increases and price decreases commensurately. Trivially easy market 
 
 1. In earlier scholarship, the Authors identify key features of sharing economy  
enterprises across a range of sectors of the economy. See Mark Anderson & Max Huffman, The 
Sharing Economy Meets the Sherman Act: Is Uber a Firm, a Cartel, or Something in Between?, 
2017 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 859, 864–86. Features of sharing economy enterprises change regularly 
as the business model matures. 
 2. See generally NIAM YARAGHI & SHAMIKA RAVI, BROOKINGS INST. INDIA CTR., THE 
CURRENT AND FUTURE STATE OF THE SHARING ECONOMY 12–15 (2017), https://www.brookings.edu/ 
wp-content/uploads/2016/12/sharingeconomy_032017final.pdf [https://perma.cc/25YZ-HHZC]. 
 3. A recent Federal Reserve Bank study finds 3 percent of US adults are engaged in  
ride-sharing work, with most involved as income supplements rather than as a primary means of 
earning money. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC  
WELL-BEING OF U.S. HOUSEHOLDS IN 2018, at 18–19 (2019), https://www.federalreserve.gov/pub-
lications/files/2018-report-economic-well-being-us-households-201905.pdf?smid=nytcore-ios-share 
[https://perma.cc/97BW-ZJJR]. 
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entry and exit in industries with sharing economy enterprises free both 
consumers and suppliers to alter decisions based on continually shifting 
preferences. The ripple effects in adjacent or upstream and downstream 
markets also promise benefits. The possibility to use a new car to  
earn revenue may incentivize a value-enhancing purchase to improve 
outcomes in markets for automobile manufacture and sale. The 
opportunity to earn revenue in the sharing economy increases worker 
choice in other markets, potentially bidding up the price of labor for  
low-skill jobs.4 Consumers may increase their consumption of travel 
(using Airbnb for lodging); social engagement (using Uber to enable a 
night out); and home maintenance (using TaskRabbit for services).5 
With sharing economy work able to fill the gap between long-term jobs, 
or potentially replace alternative employment entirely, workers have 
increased ability to move to economic opportunity.6 
Sharing economy enterprises, like Uber and Airbnb, have cut a 
huge swath across the modern economy. However, in doing so, sharing 
economy enterprises have posed challenging questions for legal and 
regulatory regimes ranging from zoning and environmental regulation 
to employment law and antitrust. This Article analyzes how antitrust 
law should apply to attempts by workers in sharing economy 
enterprises to jointly negotiate the terms and conditions of their 
relationships with platform companies, particularly ride-sharing 
services. It suggests reconceptualizing Sherman Act doctrine in light of 
economic analysis of the market for sharing economy workers that this 
Article develops. 
Sharing economy enterprises bear superficial similarity to one 
another. Whether the industry is transportation, lodging, task services, 
or another, the dominant mode of enterprise organization consists of 
individual suppliers, platforms, and consumers.7 However, below the 
surface the enterprises display more variety than consistency. Prior 
scholarship has explained those differences and their implications  
for one particular aspect of antitrust law.8 In part because of the 
complexity, this Article concentrates its argument on the ride-sharing 
 
 4. See YARAGHI & RAVI, supra note 2, at 20–22. 
 5. For websites describing sharing economy services offered, see generally AIRBNB, 
https://www.airbnb.com (last visited Mar. 8, 2021); UBER, https://www.uber.com/ (last visited Mar. 
8, 2021); TASKRABBIT, https://www.taskrabbit.com/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2021). 
 6. Cf. YARAGHI & RAVI, supra note 2, at 20. 
 7. The legal relationships among these three parties is a matter of dispute. See generally 
infra Part II; Anderson & Huffman, supra note 1. 
 8. See Anderson & Huffman, supra note 1, at 864–81, 917–31. 
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industry, primarily represented in the United States by Uber and Lyft.9 
As a matter of terminology, this Article refers to the ride-sharing 
workforce as “workers.” The hub around which the marketplace is 
organized is the “platform,” and together with the workers this is the 
“sharing economy enterprise.”10 The users of services are “consumers.” 
Recent news reports identify two sorts of coordination on the 
most competitively sensitive of topics among drivers on ride-sharing 
platforms in the United States. One is a species of conduct sometimes 
called “surge-price manipulation,” in which drivers combine to 
strategically withdraw their services, causing the price algorithm to 
increase the ride price and permit individual drivers to take advantage 
of the increased price.11 The other is an effort to engage in classic labor 
organization and collective bargaining with the platform, through 
which drivers will collectively withhold their services unless the terms 
at which those services are provided become more generous, perhaps 
even through a drivers’ strike.12 Under classic antitrust principles, both 
of these should be considered cartel conduct. Such conduct is illegal per 
se under Section 1 of the Sherman Act13—invalid without any analysis 
of the actual possibility of an effect on the market causing harm to 
 
 9. UBER, https://www.uber.com/; LYFT, https://www.lyft.com (last visited Mar. 8, 2021). 
Other competitors also exist, although these are localized and do not register on nationwide  
market reports. See, e.g., Market Share of the Leading Ride-Hailing Companies in the United 
States from September 2017 to December 2020, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/ 
910704/market-share-of-rideshare-companies-united-states/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2021) (depicting 
the “Other” category’s shrinkage from 4 percent to effectively 0 percent over the three years  
studied). 
 10. See Anderson & Huffman, supra note 1, at 870. 
 11. See Jacob Siegal, Uber Drivers Are Reportedly Manipulating the App to Create  
Artificial Surge Pricing, BGR (June 14, 2019, 4:16 PM), https://bgr.com/2019/06/14/uber-surge-
pricing-manipulation-drivers/ [https://perma.cc/3U89-UCY4]. 
 12. See generally RIDESHARE DRIVERS UNITED, https://drivers-united.org/about 
[https://perma.cc/46UQ-LU8G] (last visited Aug. 21, 2020) (discussing efforts to achieve collective 
goals); Sara Ashley O’Brien, Why Uber and Lyft Drivers Are Striking, CNN BUS., 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/07/tech/uber-driver-strike-ipo/index.html [https://perma.cc/5MJ2-
SAY7] (May 8, 2019, 11:34 AM); Alexia Fernández Campbell, Thousands of Uber Drivers Are  
Striking in Los Angeles, VOX (Mar. 25, 2019, 4:20 PM), https://www.vox.com/2019/3/25/18280718/ 
uber-lyft-drivers-strike-la-los-angeles [https://perma.cc/6ZG8-GMCG]. Whether ironically or not, 
the success in organizing this work stoppage turned on the development of an app by Rideshare 
Drivers United. Noam Scheiber & Kate Conger, Uber and Lyft Drivers Gain Labor Clout, with 
Help from an App, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/20/business/uber-lyft-driv-
ers.html [https://perma.cc/L88C-LAMT] (July 14, 2020). 
 13. Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209, 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 1). 
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consumers14—and is in fact the sort of conduct that is regularly 
prosecuted criminally by the US Department of Justice.15  
In the case of suppliers in sharing economy enterprises, 
however, the application of the per se rule and the possibility of criminal 
prosecution seem to be overkill, at a minimum.16 Some go further to 
argue that it is categorically inappropriate in light of the relative 
bargaining positions of the participants in a transaction through a 
sharing economy enterprise—the worker, the platform, and the 
consumer.17 The literature on the antitrust implications of ride-sharing 
enterprises is missing an analysis that takes into account the wide 
variety of factual scenarios present among sharing economy 
enterprises, the economic and other social justifications for imposing or 
not imposing liability for anticompetitive conduct, and the common-law 
development of antitrust rules in the US system. This Article fills that 
gap. 
A sharing economy enterprise dramatically reallocates the risks 
and rewards of business compared to a traditional firm. This 
reallocation has occurred without a fundamental assessment of the 
legal structures in play. In a traditional firm, risks and rewards are 
allocated among investors, managers, and workers through legal 
infrastructures that have evolved over a century of legislation,  
common-law development, markets, and cultural norms and 
expectations.18 Investors provide capital and share profits or losses  
from the operation of the firm.19 Managers hire employees, who follow 
direction from managers and are owed their salaries and wages even if 
the firm loses money.20 Employees are protected by a set of regulatory 
requirements regarding minimum wages, public and private retirement 
systems, occupational safety, antidiscrimination, unemployment 
 
 14. See infra Section II.A. 
 15. See ANTITRUST DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, at I-2 (5th ed. 
2012), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/761166/download [https://perma.cc/465T-4KY2]. 
 16. To be sure, the fact of criminal liability does not necessarily imply there will be  
criminal prosecution. Small scale cartel conduct can fly beneath the radar of overextended  
antitrust enforcers. See ANTITRUST DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FY 2021 CONGRESSIONAL  
BUDGET SUBMISSION 3–11 (2020), https://www.justice.gov/doj/page/file/1246281/download 
[https://perma.cc/6B36-SUZ2]. 
 17. See, e.g., Eugene K. Kim, Note, Labor’s Antitrust Problem: A Case for Worker Welfare, 
130 YALE L.J. 428 (2020). 
 18. See generally Anderson & Huffman, supra note 1, at 884–86. 
 19. This “residual claimant” understanding dates at least to the nineteenth century. See 
generally Jacob H. Hollander, The Residual Claimant Theory of Distribution, 17 Q.J. ECON. 261 
(1903). 
 20. Mark Anderson, The Enigma of the Single Entity, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 497, 515–16 
(2014) (discussing R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937)). 
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insurance, and health insurance.21 Employees are also allowed to jointly 
negotiate wages and other terms of employment through collective 
bargaining without violating the antitrust laws.22 
A sharing economy enterprise reshuffles these rights and 
responsibilities in significant ways to which the law is only beginning 
to respond. Like investors in a traditional firm, workers in a sharing 
economy enterprise provide capital. In a ride-sharing enterprise, this is 
the acquisition (by purchase or lease) and maintenance of the car. 
However, unlike investors in a traditional firm, workers do not share in 
the profits generated by the enterprise as a whole. Unlike employees in 
a traditional firm, sharing economy workers are not guaranteed any 
form of compensation net of car expenses. Nothing in the driver’s 
contract prevents their working for nothing—if, for example, capital 
costs exceed earnings.23 Similarly, under the current state of US law, 
sharing economy workers are not provided any of the regulatory 
protections of employees.24 Collective bargaining by sharing economy 
workers would be condemned as an anticompetitive cartel by the 
current Sherman Act doctrine.25 
How should the law deal with the reallocation of rights and 
responsibilities resulting from the creation of sharing economy 
enterprises? One possibility is to try to fit the new relationships into the 
old categories. Most discussed is trying to characterize sharing economy 
workers as employees, with the platform as employer.26 As employees, 
workers would be entitled to wages, regardless of whether the 
enterprise was making money. They would also be protected by the 
employment regulatory structure. As employees, workers could 
 
 21. See, e.g., Employee Rights, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/small-business/employee-rights [https://perma.cc/HM7R-PX46] 
(last visited Mar. 8, 2021); Employee Rights, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., https://www.dol.gov/gen-
eral/topic/disability/employeerights [https://perma.cc/QU3P-B9BG] (last visited Mar. 8, 2021); 
Wages and the Fair Labor Standards Act, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., https://www.dol.gov/agen-
cies/whd/flsa [https://perma.cc/4F3T-4ABR] (last visited Mar. 8, 2021); OSHA Worker Rights and 
Protections, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., https://www.osha.gov/workers/ [https://perma.cc/WK3E-9TRE] 
(last visited Mar. 8, 2021); Labor Laws and Issues, USA.GOV, https://www.usa.gov/labor-laws 
[https://perma.cc/JPR2-HAMS] (last visited Mar. 8, 2021).  
 22. See infra Section II.B.2. 
 23. Cf. infra Section III.B.2. 
 24. See generally O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1123–26 (N.D. Cal. 
2016) (discussing litigation risks to drivers claiming misclassification and right to employee  
status). 
 25. Cf. Chamber of Com. v. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2018) (reversing  
dismissal for immunity and remanding for consideration of Sherman Act Section 1 claims in suit 
alleging city-mandated driver organization constituted a price-fixing agreement). 
 26. A theoretical alternative is to make the driver an employee of the customer. The  
Authors are aware of no serious arguments to that effect. 
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collectively bargain free from Sherman Act liability. The determination 
of whether sharing economy workers should be characterized as 
employees involves questions of doctrine and policy that make the 
outcome unclear. These questions have resulted in limited success for 
advocates of such a recharacterization.  
In the absence of such a recharacterization, how should joint 
negotiation by sharing economy workers be treated for purposes of  
the Sherman Act? This Article answers that question. It analyzes the 
question of whether sellers of labor inputs into a sharing economy 
enterprise should be able to combine to gain the benefits of joint market 
power in their negotiations with buyers. This question implicates a host 
of thorny issues of antitrust law and policy, some of which are older 
than the Sherman Act itself and others are as modern as the recently 
revitalized debate over the role of “bigness” in antitrust.27 These issues 
are knit together in this Article.  
This Article shows that sharing economy enterprises present 
concerns for monopsony in labor markets, leading to the likelihood  
that suppliers of labor to sharing economy enterprises will be  
under-compensated relative to the competitive equilibrium. The 
acuteness of this problem turns on characteristics of the market and 
can vary based on the particular geography in which services are  
offered and consumed. The law’s current approach to resolving this  
problem—permitting organization by employees through collective 
bargaining under an exemption from antitrust law28—does not,  
under the current state of federal antitrust law, help sharing economy 
workers, who would be classified as independent contractors rather 
than employees under the existing multifactor test for defining 
employment.29 This failure may best be resolved by permitting 
collective bargaining activity that promises increased marketplace 
efficiency by correcting for monopsony effects in the labor market. 
Whether such increased efficiency exists depends on the characteristics 
of each sharing economy marketplace in question. It is therefore not 
properly the subject of per se rules, either condemning or exempting the 
collective conduct. It is best resolved through a structured application 
of antitrust law’s Rule of Reason. Finally, conduct that is categorically 
separate from collective bargaining, including the reports of surge price 
 
 27. See, e.g., Lina M. Kahn, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710,  
741–42 (2017). 
 28. See infra Section II.B.2 (discussing antitrust’s labor exemption). 
 29. See infra Section II.A.3 (discussing antitrust litigation brought against the City of  
Seattle for attempting to establish a bargaining unit for ride-share drivers). 
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manipulation, offers no possibility of competitive benefit and should 
remain illegal per se. 
This Article’s analysis uncovers a perversity that may support 
arguments to legislate for solutions the market and exemptions from 
antitrust law do not provide. The procompetitive rationale for  
labor organization among sharing economy suppliers—establishing 
countervailing market power to overcome the harm caused by 
monopsony—arises in the case of suppliers least needing the benefits of 
organization. Those suppliers fit into what this Article terms the 
“fallow-assets” model of the sharing economy and can enter and exit the 
market easily. In contrast, suppliers who have made substantial 
commitments to their work in the particular market, meeting what this 
Article terms the “locked-in” model are unlikely to successfully assert a 
procompetitive rationale for organizing.30 This Article concludes that 
antitrust law is not an effective tool for resolving this paradox, which 
instead is a basis for resolution as a matter of labor policy or a social 
insurance scheme. Both are beyond the scope of this Article. 
The Article avoids an approach that some scholars have favored 
in recent years of more broadly defining the constituencies the law 
protects.31 Sometimes labeled “Neo-Brandeisian” antitrust, ideas of 
including workers, input suppliers, or even more tangentially impacted 
third parties in the set of recognized victims of market effects have 
substantial currency and surface appeal.32 If one could prove market 
effects from conduct impacting consumers, workers, and possibly 
others, the law might permit any affected party to remedy the harm, 
with benefits flowing to all market participants and others affected  
by the conduct. It might also be possible to identify goals, such as 
correcting for wealth disparities, that justify either antitrust 
interventions (challenging monopoly or monopsony) or antitrust 
exceptions (allowing monopolization or monopsonization by less 
wealthy market participants).33  
These arguments are subject to an acute critique that points to 
the incommensurability of competing goals. This threatens to reduce 
antitrust analysis to an “I know it when I see it” approach to defining 
harm.34 As others have shown and the Authors explain here, worker 
 
 30. See infra Sections III.B, IV.B. 
 31. See, e.g., MARSHALL STEINBAUM & MAURICE E. STUCKE, ROOSEVELT INST., THE 
EFFECTIVE COMPETITION STANDARD (2018). 
 32. See, e.g., Tim Wu, After Consumer Welfare, Now What? The “Protection of Competition” 
Standard in Practice, ANTITRUST CHRON., Apr. 2018, at 3–7, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249173. 
 33. See id. at 9–12. 
 34. See Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1375, 1440–41 (2009); cf. Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Collective Bargaining and Competition: The 
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interests may be consistent with consumer interests or opposed to 
consumer interests.35 In the case of the former, continuing to treat 
consumer protection as the goal of antitrust will serve worker interests 
as well. In the case of the latter—interests in opposition—it is hard to 
imagine a principled way to determine which outcome should be 
preferred or how to measure the outcomes to balance them.36 
Part II analyzes the impact of current antitrust doctrine on 
sharing economy workers who jointly negotiate with platform 
companies. It does so first by analyzing the current Sherman Act 
doctrine and then by analyzing the potential for applying the exemption 
for traditional collective bargaining. Part III analyzes the underlying 
economic structure of markets for labor. It does so first by examining 
markets for traditional employment. It then assesses how markets for 
sharing economy workers operate. In doing so, this Article identifies 
two different types of sharing economy workers and how markets for 
each type differ, as well as the perversity that the economic justification 
for labor organization is most likely to arise in the case of workers least 
needing the protections. Part IV analyzes prior scholarship regarding 
workers’ rights and the conflict with antitrust law. It outlines three 
representative approaches, all of which offer ways in which antitrust 
law could give way to allow greater worker protections. This Article 
argues for a new, alternate approach under which Sherman Act 
doctrine might adjust to reflect the economics of the labor markets 
analyzed in Part III. 
II. CURRENT LEGAL TREATMENT OF SHARING ECONOMY DRIVERS 
A. Current Legal Treatment of Agreements Among Sharing Economy 
Suppliers 
For almost 130 years, the Sherman Act has been the principal 
vehicle for federal courts to assess the competitive significance of 
conduct.37 If sharing economy workers jointly negotiate with the 
 
Application of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14, 16–17, 23–24 (1963)  
(discussing specifically the different goals of collective bargaining and antitrust). Possible benefits 
from these approaches include increasing the range of potential plaintiffs (thus, better ensuring 
antitrust challenges to monopoly) and resolving recalcitrant social problems not adequately  
addressed elsewhere in law or economics. 
 35. See Hiba Hafiz, Labor Antitrust’s Paradox, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 391–92 (2020)  
(discussing the effect of a labor market restraint favoring workers over consumers). 
 36. Id. at 395–96. 
 37. The competitive effects of coordinated conduct by multiple economic actors are  
assessed under Section One of the Act, which outlaws “contract[s], combination[s], and  
conspirac[ies] . . . in restraint of trade.” 15 U.S.C. § 1. The competitive effects of conduct by a single 
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platforms, three questions arise under Section 1 of the Act. First, are 
the drivers part of a single entity and therefore incapable of conspiring 
for purposes of the Sherman Act? Second, if the drivers are not 
protected by the single entity rule, have they entered into an agreement 
with each other? Third, if such an agreement exists, will its competitive 
effect be assessed under a rule of per se illegality—illegal by virtue  
of the agreement itself, irrespective of its effects—or the Rule of  
Reason—illegal if it causes or is expected to cause harm in the 
market?38 This Section analyzes these questions under existing 
authority. It concludes that collective action by drivers, even if directed 
to curing market imperfections from monopsony, would be treated as 
per se illegal and subject to automatic invalidation. Parts III and IV 
argue that this approach fails to take into account significant aspects of 
the economic relationship among the drivers, the platform companies, 
and consumers.  
1. Agreements Among Sharing Economy Suppliers Are Not Protected 
by the Single Entity Rule 
The first element of a Section 1 claim is that an agreement must 
exist among separate economic actors.39 In Copperweld Corp. v. 
Independence Tube Corp., the US Supreme Court held that a parent 
corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary are incapable of conspiring 
under Section 1 because they are not pursuing separate economic 
interests.40 In American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League,41 the 
Court held that NFL teams were capable of conspiring under Section 1 
because—distinct from the facts of Copperweld—they were organized 
as independent firms and not as subsidiaries of a parent corporation; 
they were pursuing separate economic interests.42 Employees of a firm 
are considered part of the firm for purposes of Section 1 and are 
incapable of conspiring with each other or the firm when they are 
pursuing the interests of the firm.43  
 
firm are assessed under Section Two, which outlaws “monopoliz[ing . . .] any part of the trade or 
commerce among the several States.” 15 U.S.C. § 2. 
 38. See generally KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY & COMMON LAW 
EVOLUTION 104–12 (2003) (explaining the per se rule and Rule of Reason). 
 39. Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 770–71 (1984). In prior  
scholarship, the Authors analyzed this question in depth with regard to coordination among  
suppliers and the platform through the sharing economy enterprise. Anderson & Huffman, supra 
note 1, at 898–917. 
 40. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 777. 
 41. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183 (2010). 
 42. Id. at 200–01. 
 43. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 770–71. 
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If sharing economy workers were deemed to be part of a single 
entity in conducting joint negotiations with the platform companies, the 
negotiations would be legal under Section 1 since no agreement among 
the workers would exist.44 In Copperweld and American Needle, the 
Court focused on combined economic interest in determining whether 
the single entity rule applied. Suppliers jointly negotiating for better 
terms have a shared desire for better terms but have not combined their 
economic interest to a sufficient degree to qualify as a single entity.45 
Prior scholarship reconciled the rules in Copperweld (holding 
separately incorporated businesses were a single entity) and American 
Needle (holding independent football teams were not a single entity 
even when cooperating in a joint licensing scheme) by reference to the 
sharing of profits and losses that characterizes integration into a firm.46 
Owners of a business entity pool their revenues and costs to share the 
resulting profits or losses. This sharing of profits and losses creates 
incentives for efficiencies that justify single entity treatment. Sharing 
economy workers share neither costs nor revenues among themselves 
or with the platform. Each incurs their own costs and keeps the revenue 
generated by their rides. A mere common desire to charge more does 
not justify single entity treatment.47 Indeed, such a common interest in 
higher prices exists in all price fixing cartels.48 
A potentially confusing part of the single entity analysis as 
applied to the drivers’ agreement relates to the dispute over whether 
the drivers are employees of the platform company. Generally, 
employees are considered part of a single entity with the employer.49 
Therefore, one might think that the question of whether drivers are 
employees of Uber would control the single entity question. However, 
that is not the case. Employees are considered part of the same entity 
as the employer only when they are pursuing the employer’s interest.50 
This is why the labor exemption is so important for employees who 
belong to a union.51 Without an exemption, their collective demands for 
higher pay, which are not in pursuit of the employer’s interest, would 
merely be an illegal cartel.52  
 
 44. Anderson & Huffman, supra note 1, at 888–89. 
 45. See id. at 900. 
 46. Anderson, supra note 20, at 527–34. 
 47. Id. at 537. 
 48. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 201–02 (2010). 
 49. Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984). 
 50. See id. at 769 n.15; see also 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST 
LAW ¶ 1471 (3d ed. 2010). 
 51. See infra Section II.B. 
 52. 1B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 255 (4th ed. 2013). 
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2. Joint Negotiations and Surge Price Manipulation Reflect Horizontal 
Agreements Among Drivers 
If separate economic actors exist, the second step in analyzing 
the agreement element asks whether those actors have coordinated 
their conduct. Sometimes this question is easy to answer. Actors 
sometimes meet, talk to each other, and enter into express agreements. 
This is true when firms enter into distribution agreements,53 joint 
venture agreements,54 or form trade associations.55 Similarly, cartelists 
enter into express agreements fixing prices. However, sometimes actors 
are alleged to have horizontally coordinated their behavior without 
express horizontal agreement. In Interstate Circuit v. United States,56 
the Supreme Court determined that a communicated agreement among 
horizontal competitors was not necessary for finding an agreement 
under Section 1. The Court relied on the coordination of horizontal 
conduct through a “hub” oriented vertically to the competitors, creating 
a hub-and-spoke agreement that existed despite the lack of express 
agreement among individual competitors.57 However, the Interstate 
Circuit rule is narrow. In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Court held 
that mere interdependent parallel conduct, in the absence of allegations 
of a hub coordinating the horizontal activity and creating implicit 
mutual understandings among the horizontal competitors, was not 
sufficient for an agreement under Section 1.58 
If drivers communicate with each other in order to bargain 
collectively over the terms of their relationship with the platform 
companies, whether coordination is through express coordination 
among drivers or through a hub—perhaps a single representative, or  
a communication app59—this collective decision will constitute an 
agreement under Section 1. They will have expressed their commitment 
to each other that they will coordinate their conduct in jointly 
negotiating with the platform company. Their behavior is not merely 
consciously parallel. It is the product of a communicated agreement.60 
 
 53. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 883 (2007). 
 54. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 4 (2006). 
 55. Maple Flooring Mfrs.’ Ass’n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 565 (1925). 
 56. Interstate Cir. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939). 
 57. Id. at 226–27 (identifying a hub-and-spoke agreement as sufficient to represent a  
horizontal agreement, despite a lack of allegations of communications between horizontal  
competitors). The Authors analyze the hub-and-spoke nature of the sharing economy enterprise 
agreement in Anderson & Huffman, supra note 1, at 900–07. 
 58. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553–54 (2007). 
 59. See, e.g., supra note 12. 
 60. See William H. Page, Facilitating Practices and Concerted Action Under Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act, in ANTITRUST LAW & ECONOMICS 23, 29–30 (Keith N. Hylton ed., 2010). 
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Other species of actual or alleged coordination would be treated 
similarly. The May 8, 2019, “work stoppage” or “drivers’ strike”61 
represented collective action by drivers reached by agreement. Reports 
of surge price manipulation, which is believed to have been widespread 
in localized markets, also would reflect express agreements among 
drivers to game the pricing algorithm.62  
If an agreement exists for purposes of Section 1, what is the 
nature of that agreement? This question of characterization will be 
important for purposes of determining whether the agreement is per se 
illegal and, if not, determining how it will be assessed under the Rule 
of Reason.63 The agreement to jointly negotiate with the platform 
company includes a commitment to accept the price and other  
terms that the negotiations produce. The drivers might authorize 
representatives to agree with the platform company on their behalf. 
Alternatively, the drivers might have a vote to accept the negotiated 
terms. Either way, a communicated agreement among the drivers is 
present. 
3. Is a Suppliers’ Agreement Per Se Illegal? 
If an agreement among separate economic actors is found, the 
competitive effects of that agreement would be assessed under the 
second element of the Section 1 claim.64 Some agreements are subject 
to rules of per se illegality, condemned without any consideration of 
possible beneficial effects from the conduct.65 In 1940, the Supreme 
Court adopted a per se rule for price fixing by competitors.66 In 1972, 
the Court applied a per se rule to agreements among competitors 
allocating customers.67 Over several decades the Court has discussed 
 
 61. See supra note 12. 
 62. Siegal, supra note 11. One description of a changed surge-pricing algorithm may  
reduce the incentive to engage in manipulation and could possibly explain the lack of recent reports 
of the conduct. Aaron Gordon & Dhruv Mehrotra, We Think Uber and Lyft’s New Surge Fares 
Screw Drivers and Riders. Help Us Prove It, JALOPNIK (July 1, 2019, 2:01 PM), https://jalopnik.com/ 
we-think-uber-and-lyfts-new-surge-fares-screw-drivers-a-1835952856 [https://perma.cc/5HA9-
DQLJ]. 
 63. See infra Sections II.A.3, II.A.4. 
 64. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (stating that an agreement must reflect a “restraint of trade”). 
 65. See 2 WILLIAM H. PAGE, JOHN E. LOPATKA & MAX HUFFMAN, KINTNER’S FEDERAL 
ANTITRUST LAW §§ 9.5, 9.6 (2013 & Supp. 2020).  
 66. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940). 
 67. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (“One of the classic  
examples of a per se violation of § 1 is an agreement between competitors at the same level of the 
market structure to allocate territories in order to minimize competition.”). 
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the potential for applying a per se rule to boycotts.68 The Supreme Court 
has also overturned various per se rules.69 Whenever the law adopts a 
categorical rule, like a rule of per se illegality, it must determine the 
boundaries of the forbidden category. For example, the Supreme Court 
spent decades adjusting the boundaries of the per se rule against price 
fixing by competitors.70 Likewise, defining the boundaries of conduct 
demonstrating a per se illegal group boycott remains challenging.71 
Analysis of the application of these rules in the context of joint action 
by sharing workers requires a determination of the parameters of the 
per se rules.  
The per se rule most likely to apply to an agreement among 
workers is the rule against price fixing by competitors.72 The 
parameters of the rule have been frequently litigated. At its simplest, 
price fixing is easy to identify, but as the following paragraphs show, 
 
 68. Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) (“Group boycotts, 
or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders, have long been held to be in the  
forbidden category.”); Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 
284, 290 (1985) (“This Court has long held that certain concerted refusals to deal or group boycotts 
are so likely to restrict competition without any offsetting efficiency gains that they should be 
condemned as per se violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act.”); FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 
447, 458 (1986) (“[T]he category of restraints classed as group boycotts is not to be expanded  
indiscriminately, and the per se approach has generally been limited to cases in which firms with 
market power boycott suppliers or customers in order to discourage them from doing business with 
a competitor”); FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 433 (1990) (“Moreover, while 
the per se rule against price fixing and boycotts is indeed justified in part by ‘administrative  
convenience,’ the Court of Appeals erred in describing the prohibition as justified only by such 
concerns. The per se rules also reflect a longstanding judgment that the prohibited practices by 
their nature have ‘a substantial potential for impact on competition.’”). 
 69. See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), overruled by 
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (minimum resale price 
maintenance subject to the Rule of Reason); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), overruled 
by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (maximum resale price maintenance subject to the Rule 
of Reason); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled by Cont’l T. V., 
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (vertical non-price restrictions subject to the Rule of 
Reason). 
 70. Compare United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940), with 
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 18–22 (1979), and Arizona v. Maricopa 
Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 351–56 (1982). 
 71. See Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 432–36 (holding per se illegal group 
boycott although effect was vertical in nature); NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 135 
(1998) (holding no application of the per se rule to a boycott in the absence of a horizontal  
agreement). 
 72. The rule against group boycotts is frequently applied to horizontal agreements that 
are aimed at competitors or someone party to the agreement. Compare Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 
U.S. at 458–59, with Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 432–36. The victims of the drivers’ 
agreement are the platform companies, and possibly the riders, neither of whom are competitors 
of the drivers. Therefore, the victims of the drivers’ agreement are not competitors of the drivers 
and the per se rule against boycotts would not apply. 
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the Supreme Court has both applied the rule when the challenged 
agreement did not involve a literal price fix and has declined to apply 
the rule when the challenged agreement did involve a literal price  
fix.73 In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,74 the defendant oil 
companies agreed to engage in coordinated purchases of oil in the spot 
market in an effort to raise the market price.75 The Court condemned 
the agreement as a per se violation of Section 1 in the classic statement 
of the rule: “[u]nder the Sherman Act a combination formed for the 
purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or 
stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce 
is illegal per se.”76 Thus, the per se rule against price fixing derives from 
a case in which the defendants did not fix a literal price. Consistent 
with this broad approach, the Court condemned as per se illegal price 
fixing an agreement among competitors to refuse to sell on credit.77  
The per se rule against horizontal group boycotts has substantial 
overlaps with price fixing, as the boycott can serve as an enforcement 
mechanism to support the price fix. The clearest analogy to a potential 
drivers’ agreement is a group boycott case involving individual 
attorneys practicing in the same courthouse in Washington, DC called 
FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n.78 Specifically, this case 
significantly parallels a horizontal agreement among drivers designed 
to improve their bargaining position with the platform. In Superior 
Court Trial Lawyers, the defendants were lawyers who provided 
indigent criminal defense services by court appointment in the District 
of Columbia.79 The government paid the court-appointed counsel by the 
hour. Members of the association formed a strike committee and 
ultimately voted to refuse to take any more court appointments until 
the hourly rates were raised.80 This refusal resulted in substantial 
difficulty in the administration of justice and the District ultimately 
raised the hourly rates, bringing the strike to an end.81 
 
 73. Cf. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 222–23 (applying price fixing rule to  
agreement better classified as market manipulation); Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 
432–36 (declining to treat a price fix among lawyers as such, instead classifying it as a group 
boycott). 
 74. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150. 
 75. Id. at 167–68. 
 76. Id. at 223. 
 77. Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 648 (1980) (per curiam). 
 78. Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 432–36. 
 79. Id. at 415. 
 80. Id. at 416–17. 
 81. Id. at 417–18. 
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The Supreme Court held that the strike constituted a per se 
illegal boycott.82 Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred 
in part and dissented in part critiquing the boycott rationale.83 The 
majority responded to the criticism by noting that the defendants’ 
conduct included not only a refusal to deal but also price fixing by 
competitors.84 How does Superior Court Trial Lawyers help to analyze 
the drivers’ agreement? The lawyers’ purpose in entering into their 
agreement was to take a joint position regarding price. This purpose 
was dispositive and led to the application of the per se rule. The drivers, 
of course, have a purpose to affect the price, and their agreement to 
achieve that purpose would be per se illegal under Superior Court Trial 
Lawyers.85 
Despite the substantial parallels to these authorities applying 
the per se rule, the Section 1 analysis is complicated by a number of 
cases in which the Supreme Court has declined to apply the per se rule 
to agreements among competitors that were intended to affect the 
market price. In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United 
States, the defendants had agreed that they would not engage in 
competitive bidding.86 The Court viewed the agreement as aimed at 
maintaining prices.87 Nevertheless, the Court declined to apply the per 
se rule, nominally applying the Rule of Reason.88 In NCAA v. Board of 
Regents of the University of Oklahoma, the defendant universities had 
limited the number of football games that could be broadcast on 
 
 82. Id. at 432. The Court’s conclusion that the agreement among the lawyers was a per se 
illegal boycott is in tension with Indiana Federation of Dentists, which declined to apply the per se 
rule against boycotts because the victim of the boycott was not a competitor of anyone party to the 
agreement. 476 U.S. 447, 457–58 (1986). 
 83. Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 452 n.9 (Brennan, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 84. Id. at 436 n.19 (majority opinion) (“In response to Justice BRENNAN’s opinion, and 
particularly to its observation that some concerted arrangements that might be characterized as 
‘group boycotts’ may not merit per se condemnation, see post, at 790–791, n. 9, we emphasize that 
this case involves not only a boycott but also a horizontal price-fixing arrangement—a type of  
conspiracy that has been consistently analyzed as a per se violation for many decades. All of the 
‘group boycott’ cases cited in Justice BRENNAN’s footnote involved nonprice restraints. There was 
likewise no price-fixing component in any of the boycotts listed on pages 787–788 of Justice 
BRENNAN’s opinion. Indeed, the text of the opinion virtually ignores the price-fixing component 
of respondents’ concerted action.”). 
 85. See 2 PAGE ET AL., supra note 65, §§ 9.5, 9.6. 
 86. Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 683 (1978). 
 87. Id. at 693 (footnote omitted) (“The Society argues that the restraint is justified because 
bidding on engineering services is inherently imprecise, would lead to deceptively low bids, and 
would thereby tempt individual engineers to do inferior work with consequent risk to public safety 
and health. The logic of this argument rests on the assumption that the agreement will tend to 
maintain the price level; if it had no such effect, it would not serve its intended purpose.”). 
 88. Id. at 696. 
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television and put a price on the broadcast rights for the games.89 
Despite acknowledging that the agreement looked like per se illegal 
price fixing, the Court decided to apply the Rule of Reason because “this 
case involves an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition 
are essential if the product is to be available at all.”90 The best 
explanation for the holdings in Professional Engineers and Board of 
Regents is the Supreme Court’s discomfort with applying the per se rule 
to more complex business structures, including professions and sports 
leagues, for which unrestrained competition might be inconsistent with 
providing the product at all.91 This reticence might provide a basis for 
an argument on behalf of the drivers that the per se rule against price 
fixing does not apply to their conduct. 
The US Chamber of Commerce sued the city of Seattle in 2017, 
challenging an ordinance providing for collective bargaining by  
ride-sharing drivers. The Chamber won a preliminary injunction and, 
on appeal, succeeded in the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
against a state-action immunity argument. The Chamber alleged price 
fixing in violation of Section 1.92 While the case was on remand, the city 
of Seattle amended its ordinance to remove the provisions allowing 
collective bargaining about price, causing the Chamber to dismiss its 
Sherman Act claims.93 
In summary, there are strong arguments that the drivers’ strike 
is per se illegal as price fixing and a group boycott by competitors under 
existing Supreme Court authority. Parts III and IV argue that this 
authority fails to take into account significant economic aspects of the 
drivers’ relationship with the platform companies and consumers. 
4. Joint Action by Sharing Economy Workers Would Be Condemned 
Under the Rule of Reason as Currently Applied 
Under the current Section 1 doctrine, most agreements are 
assessed under the Rule of Reason, rather than deemed per se illegal.94 
Originating in Judge Taft’s opinion in United States v. Addyston 
 
 89. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 91–93 (1984). 
 90. Id. at 101. 
 91. Cf. HYLTON, supra note 38, at 125–29 (discussing Professional Engineers and Board 
of Regents as reflecting “[p]ressure on [the] Rule of Reason [b]oundary”). 
 92. Complaint at 17, Chamber of Com. v. City of Seattle, 274 F. Supp. 3d 1155 (W.D. 
Wash. 2017) (No. 2:17-cv-00370-RSL) (first citing FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. 
411, 422 (1990); then citing FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 457–58 (1986); and then 
citing Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 693–95). 
 93. Stipulation and Order for Dismissal Without Prejudice, Chamber of Com. v. City of 
Seattle, 274 F. Supp. 3d 1155 (W.D. Wash. 2017) (No. 2:17-cv-00370-RSL).  
 94. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007). 
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Pipe & Steel Co.95 and most clearly explained by Justice Brandeis in 
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,96 the Rule of Reason treats 
agreements that regulate competition, thereby promoting rather than 
suppressing competition, through an evaluation of the effects of those 
agreements.97 Courts have provided a structured approach to the Rule 
of Reason by separating the analysis into a series of questions and 
allocating burdens to the plaintiff and defendant on each question, 
reflecting both the parties’ respective access to evidence and the danger 
of false positive or false negative results. The threshold question is 
whether the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence of the likelihood 
that the agreement has an anticompetitive effect. For example, in 
Professional Engineers,98 the Court concluded that an agreement 
among the members of an association of engineers to refrain from 
competitive bidding posed sufficient anticompetitive potential to meet 
this threshold.99 Similarly, in Board of Regents,100 the Court held that 
an agreement among universities to limit the number of football games 
broadcast on television and pricing the games that were broadcast met 
the threshold.101 In FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists,102 the Court 
reached the same conclusion regarding an agreement among dentists 
to refuse to supply x-rays to insurance companies.103  
In each of these cases, the Court permitted the case to proceed 
under the Rule of Reason without requiring the plaintiff to engage in a 
sophisticated analysis of the market and the likely competitive effects 
of the conduct.104 This approach is sometimes characterized as a “quick 
look” version of the Rule of Reason.105 The Court has not always been 
willing to apply this quick look approach. In California Dental Ass’n v. 
FTC,106 the Court declined to apply this approach to an agreement 
 
 95. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 
175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
 96. See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). 
 97. See id. at 238–39; see also 2 PAGE ET AL., supra note 65, §§ 9.5–9.7. 
 98. Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
 99. Id. at 692. 
 100. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 101. Id. at 113. 
 102. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986). 
 103. Id. at 459. 
 104. See Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 693–96 (rejecting purported efficiency  
justification as non-cognizable); Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 113–20 (considering 
but not accepting purported efficiency justifications). 
 105. See Anderson & Huffman, supra note 1, at 914–16 (arguing for application of the quick 
look to the Uber pricing algorithm); 2 PAGE ET AL., supra note 65, § 9.7. 
 106. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999). 
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among dentists that limited the type of advertising by dentists.107 
Justice Souter, writing for the Court, determined that the Commission 
had not presented enough evidence of the likelihood of anticompetitive 
effects to meet the threshold question under the Rule of Reason.108 
If a plaintiff meets the initial burden of presenting sufficient 
evidence of the likelihood of anticompetitive effects of an agreement, the 
burden shifts to the defendant to offer evidence of a procompetitive 
justification for the agreement.109 To be considered, the justification 
must serve the goal of enhancing competition. In Professional 
Engineers, the Court rejected the defendants’ attempt to justify a ban 
on competitive bidding based on the assertion that bidding would lead 
to poor-quality engineering. The Court held that “[t]he Rule of Reason 
does not support a defense based on the assumption that competition 
itself is unreasonable.”110 Similarly, in Indiana Federation of Dentists, 
the Court rejected the defendants’ attempt to justify an agreement to 
refuse to supply insurance companies with x-rays by asserting that 
doing so would be bad for patients.111 The Court characterized the 
argument as an attack on the basic policy of the Sherman Act.112 If the 
defendant makes an adequate showing of a procompetitive justification, 
the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the anticompetitive 
effects outweigh the procompetitive effects.113 Goldfarb v. Virginia State 
Bar also treated an agreement not to lower the price for a particular 
form of legal services as price fixing and subjected it to the per se rule.114 
The quick look approach to the initial question of the likelihood 
of anticompetitive effects is likely applying the Rule of Reason to a 
drivers’ agreement under current authority. Assuming the goal of the 
drivers’ agreement is to raise driver compensation, whether in 
 
 107. Id. at 778.   
 108. Id. at 775–76; see also Stephen Calkins, California Dental Association: Not a Quick 
Look but Not the Full Monty, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 495, 504 (2000). Justice Breyer’s dissent in  
California Dental Ass’n argued that the obviousness of the competitive harm from the agreement 
should have served to shift the burden to the defendant. Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 784–85 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 109. Whether this burden is one of persuasion or mere production of evidence is addressed 
below. See infra Section IV.B. 
 110. Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978). 
 111. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 463 (1986). 
 112. Id. 
 113. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason, 70 FLA. L. REV. 81, 103–04 (2018). 
 114. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). There is an interesting question to 
what degree these cases involving learned professions, which frequently involve individuals 
providing services somewhat autonomously (either as solo practitioners or as employees with  
ethical obligations to exercise independent judgment), are good analogs to the ride-sharing market. 
Many of the rationales for individual autonomy for professionals might apply with similar force to 
workers in a ride-sharing enterprise. 
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monetary terms or in terms of a requirement of nonmonetary benefits, 
a plaintiff challenging the drivers’ agreement would be able to quickly 
demonstrate the likelihood of anticompetitive effects—an increase in 
the price of services provided and commensurate reduction in the 
quantity demanded. Because of the clear impact on price and output 
from such an agreement, the dissent by Justice Breyer in California 
Dental—rather than the majority opinion by Justice Souter—is likely 
to control the decision of the applicable standard.115 
Under existing authority, there do not seem to be any 
procompetitive justifications for a strike, collective bargaining, or any 
other horizontal agreement designed to raise worker pay in a  
ride-sharing enterprise. Workers’ earnings from providing ride-sharing 
services are a function of competition among them, which likely impacts 
their compensation in two ways. First, the willingness of workers to 
drive in a ride-sharing enterprise reduces the platform’s need to offer 
generous terms as part of the driver agreement. Second, in day-to-day 
driving, competitive entry (turning on the app) leads to lower revenues 
per ride given. But, consistent with Professional Engineers, Indiana 
Federation of Dentists, and Goldfarb, unhappiness with the results of 
competition is not a cognizable justification for an agreement not to 
compete.116 In the absence of a procompetitive justification, an 
agreement among the workers would be condemned under the current 
Rule of Reason authority. 
Current Sherman Act authority would deny the drivers the 
protection of the single entity rule and find a horizontal agreement 
among the drivers. The most likely treatment of such an agreement is 
under the inflexible per se rule, resulting in automatic illegality. Even 
if not per se illegal, existing authority would condemn the agreement 
under a quick look version of the Rule of Reason. Part IV recommends 
an evolution of doctrine that would subject negotiation by the drivers to 
the Rule of Reason and open the possibility of it being permitted under 







 115. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 784–86 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting); 
HYLTON, supra note 38, at 128–29; Calkins, supra note 108, at 504–05. 
 116. See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text. 
 117. Surge price manipulation would remain per se illegal under the Author’s approach. 
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B. Intersection of Labor and Employment Law with Antitrust 
Principles 
Taken to its literal extreme, the prohibition of restraints on 
trade in Section 1 of the Sherman Act produces untenable results, 
preventing the coordination of entrepreneurship with capital, the 
aggregation of capital, agreements that on their own might be harmful 
but are necessary to support beneficial agreements, among other 
examples.118 As a result, both at common law and soon after the 
enactment of the Sherman Act, courts recognized the necessity of 
interpreting the prohibitions of restraints to apply only to unreasonable 
restraints.119 The “reasonableness” limitation—the basis for the Rule of 
Reason in antitrust—has a labor exemption at its core. In the examples 
of reasonable restraints that then-Judge William Howard Taft outlined 
in Addyston Pipe & Steel, several spoke to combinations of workers (for 
example, in a partnership) or agreements among small entrepreneurs 
(for example, a noncompete agreement in the sale of a business) that 
restrain competition in the labor market.120 Judge Taft drew these 
examples from common law authorities, some long predating the 
Sherman Act.121 
However, consistent with the principles outlined in the prior 
Section, early applications of the Sherman Act in labor markets treated 
labor-organizing conduct as a wage-fixing cartel, with employers the 
direct victims.122 The labor exemption, a partially statutory, partially 
common-law carve-out for union organizing by employees, gave legal 
sanction to certain exercises of labor market power without regard to 
the effect on consumers.123 This exemption developed as a preference 
for social policy favoring labor interests over competing consumer 
interests.124 This Section outlines the development of non-antitrust 
labor policy as applied to ride-sharing enterprises before analyzing the 
labor exemption in the ride-sharing context. 
 
 118. Any such coordination both prevents competition between the parties and prevents 
each of the parties from cooperating with others—each of which represents a restraint that read 
literally would be prohibited by the Sherman Act. 
 119. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 
U.S. 211 (1899). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 279–82. 
 122. See, e.g., Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 304–09 (1908) (overruling demurrer entered 
for defendant United Hatters of North America in a suit by plaintiff manufacturers of hats). 
 123. See infra Section II.B.2. 
 124. See generally 9 EARL W. KINTNER, JOSEPH BAUER & WILLIAM PAGE, KINTNER’S 
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 72.1 (1989 & Supp. 2020). 
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1. Labor and Employment Law Treatment of Ride-Sharing 
Enterprises 
A substantial body of law has developed, challenging  
ride-sharing enterprises’ efforts to designate drivers as independent 
contractors, thus avoiding employment law protections that would 
apply if employee status was proved. These cases primarily reflect 
efforts by ride-sharing drivers, or their purported representatives, to be 
treated as employees rather than independent contractors for purposes 
of legal protections and benefits.125 Both federal and state law 
protections are available to employees but not to contractors.126 The 
employment status of workers in ride-sharing enterprises bears an 
important relationship to the antitrust consequences of organizing by 
these workers for collective bargaining purposes.127 
The employment question requires courts to distinguish 
between an “employee” and an “independent contractor.”128 In its  
 
 125. See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (class 
representing Uber drivers seeking treatment as employees). 
 126. See Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-573, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61230, at *19–20 
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2018) (citing Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 203, 206–207), vacated, 951 
F.3d 137 (3d Cir. 2020); id. at *20 (noting that Pennsylvania’s Minimum Wage Act looks to Federal 
law for the definition of employee). 
 127. See infra Section II.B.2, Part III. 
 128. See Fact Sheet 13: Employment Relationship Under the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA), U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. 1 (July 2008) [hereinafter Fact Sheet 13], https://www.dol.gov/sites/dol-
gov/files/WHD/legacy/files/whdfs13.pdf [https://perma.cc/NZ57-M5DS]. The distinction between 
employee and contractor is old. See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728–29 (1947) 
(quoting Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947)) (noting the “broad” definition 
of employ, with its genesis in child-labor statutes, that was “not so broad as to include those ‘who, 
without any express or implied compensation agreement, might work for their own advantage on 
the premises of another’”). The modern statement of the employee-contractor distinction is fact 
dependent, turning on application of a multifactor test broadly recognized by the courts and  
the Department of Labor. See Fact Sheet 13, supra, at 1. The Third Circuit’s representative  
formulation of the test, applied by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Razak v. Uber, requires 
a court to consider: 
(1) the degree of the alleged employer’s right to control the manner in which the work 
is to be performed; 
(2) the alleged employee’s opportunity for profit or loss depending upon his  
managerial skill; 
(3) the alleged employee’s investment in equipment or materials required for his task, 
or his employment of helpers; 
(4) whether the service rendered requires a special skill; 
(5) the degree of permanence of the working relationship; and 
(6) whether the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer’s business. 
Razak, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61230, at *21 (citing Donovan v. DialAmerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 
1376, 1382 (3d Cir. 1985)). The US Department of Labor has recently followed a seven-factor test, 
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now-withdrawn April 2019 opinion letter, the Department of Labor’s 
Wage and Hour Division stated a variation of the several-factor control 
test.129 And state laws on the question are similar. California law, 
interpreted in O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, notes the preeminence of 
“control” but also considers “several ‘secondary’ indicia” including:  
(a) whether the one performing services is engaged in a distinct occupation or 
business; (b) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the 
work is usually done under the direction of the principal or by a specialist without 
supervision; (c) the skill required in the particular occupation; (d) whether the 
principal or the worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work 
for the person doing the work; (e) the length of time for which the services are to be 
performed; (f) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (g) whether 
or not the work is a part of the regular business of the principal; and (h) whether or 
not the parties believe they are creating the relationship of employer-employee.130 
In O’Connor, a putative class of Uber drivers sued Uber, 
contending the plaintiffs were employees, not independent contractors, 
and thus were entitled to legal protections including full pass-through 
of gratuities.131 On an application of the “control plus” test from 
California law, the O’Connor court determined that ride-sharing 
drivers were presumptively employees and refused Uber’s motion for 
summary judgment.132 Comparable cases have been brought on both US 
coasts and against both Uber and Lyft,133 seeking protections including 
 
which tracks the judicial formulae, in applying its own definition of employee. See Fact Sheet 13, 
supra, at 1. According to the DOL:  
[a]n employee, as distinguished from a person who is engaged in business for himself 
or herself, is one who, as a matter of economic reality, follows the usual path of an 
employee and is dependent upon the business to which he or she renders service. The 
employer-employee relationship under the FLSA is tested by economic reality rather 
than technical concepts. It is not determined by common law standards relating to  
master and servant.  
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter (Sept. 5, 2002), 2002 WL 32406602, at *2. 
Under that test, the DOL applies seven factors that substantially mirror the six factors from  
Razak. See Fact Sheet 13, supra, at 1. 
 129.  U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter (Apr. 29, 2019), 2019 WL 
1977301, at *4 (withdrawn Feb. 19, 2021). The Federal employee-contractor distinction is in  
flux as of this publication. See Independent Contractor Status Under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act: Delay of Effective Date, 86 Fed. Reg. 8326 (Feb. 5, 2021). 
 130. S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Rels., 48 Cal. 3d 341, 350–51 (1989) (cited 
in O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1138). 
 131. O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1135, 1137–38. Both federal- and state-law protections 
turn on the common law employer-contractor distinction. See id. at 1138–40. 
 132. See id. at 1135, 1138–40 (California, putative class action against Uber). 
 133. See Bekele v. Lyft, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 3d 284, 288 (D. Mass. 2016) (Massachusetts, 
putative class action against Lyft); Razak, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61230, at *2, *8 (Pennsylvania, 
putative class action against Uber). 
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minimum wages and overtime pay,134 and coverage of vehicle 
maintenance, ownership, and insurance expenses.135 Despite such 
favorable reception in some courts, ride-sharing drivers have uniformly 
failed to achieve successful outcomes in lawsuits seeking treatment as 
employees for purposes of wage-and-hour and benefits obligations. In 
several cases, including O’Connor, the drivers have been subjected  
to mandatory arbitration provisions in their contracts with the 
platforms.136 In others, courts have granted summary judgment to Uber 
on the question of employee status.137 
For a short period, California served as a substantial exception 
to this trend, with a state-law amendment classifying sharing economy 
workers as employees more readily than at common law or under 
federal law.138 California’s “gig-economy bill” took effect in January 
2020 and responded to the perceived “misclassification of workers as 
independent contractors.”139 It placed the burden on the “hiring entity” 
to show (1) freedom from control and direction, (2) work performed 
outside the hiring entity’s usual business, and (3) the person is 
customarily engaged in independently established trade of the same 
nature.140 It would be difficult for a ride-sharing platform to 
demonstrate the third element in particular. In a lawsuit by the 
California attorney general to enforce AB-5, a trial court preliminarily 
enjoined Uber and Lyft to reclassify ride-sharing drivers as employees, 
relying instead on the second element of the statutory test.141 The 
preliminary injunction was stayed on appeal.142 However, in November 
 
 134. See Razak, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61230, at *2, *19 (“Plaintiffs contend that they are 
‘employees’ under the FLSA, and therefore entitled to overtime pay and other benefits”). 
 135. See Bekele, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 289 (“The complaint alleges that . . . drivers must pay 
for expenses that their employer Lyft should pay for, including costs of vehicle ownership and 
maintenance, gas, and insurance.”). 
 136. See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 904 F.3d 1087, 1094–95 (9th Cir. 2018) (reversing 
the district court’s refusal to compel arbitration).  
 137. See Razak, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61230, at *3. 
 138. See Assemb. B. 5, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
 139. Id. § 1. 
 140. Id. § 2. These elements were initially stated by the California Supreme Court in  
Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 42 (Cal. 2018). 
 141. People v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CGC-20-584402, 2020 WL 5440308, *3, *18 (Cal.  
Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 2020) (issuing a preliminary injunction because “[d]efendants’ drivers do not 
perform work that is ‘outside the usual course’ of their businesses”), aff’d, 270 Cal. Rptr. 3d 290 
(Ct. App. 2020). 
 142. Kate Conger, Uber and Lyft Get Reprieve After Threatening to Shut Down, N.Y.  
TIMES (Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/20/technology/uber-lyft-california-shut-
down.html [https://perma.cc/A627-TU4V]. Scholarly commentary largely condemns the outcomes 
dismissing cases that seek to classify drivers as employees, as leading to irredeemable  
bargaining-power disparities between centralized employers and highly diffuse independent  
contractors. See, e.g., Hiba Hafiz, Picketing in the New Economy, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1845, 1851, 
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2020, California voters broadly supported an Uber and Lyft-sponsored 
proposition, Proposition 22, which reversed the impact of AB-5. 
Proposition 22 declared app-based drivers as independent contractors, 
so long as the platform (called “network company” in the terms of 
Proposition 22) did not establish a work schedule or minimum hours 
requirement, did not require the driver to accept a ride request, did not 
restrict driving with competing services, and did not restrict engaging 
in other employment.143  
Both federal and state law broadly treat ride-share drivers  
as contractors, rather than employees. Efforts have been made to 
change that definition, both through increasingly broad definitions of 
“employment” in court and legislative change in California.144 Those 
efforts have not succeeded, in one case due to a popular referendum 
reversing an attempted legislative change in California. Next, this 
Article approaches the interplay between labor law and antitrust law 
from the antitrust perspective. The next Subsection demonstrates that 
the labor law exemption from antitrust cannot be relied on to protect 
workers in a ride-sharing enterprise against liability from likely illegal 
coordinated activity. 
2. Labor Exemption from Antitrust 
The labor market is, on the one hand, merely an upstream 
market for inputs into the production process no different from a 
market for raw materials, capital, or any other factor of production. 
Such a reductive explanation of labor markets might justify subjecting 
 
1886–89 (2018) (calling for increased picketing options to mitigate bargaining disparity). In a  
potent critique of the bargaining-power disparities facing workers in a “fissured business  
arrangement,” Professor Paul identifies an inconsistency between treatment of a ride-sharing firm 
as an application company supplying an input to individual service providers, for purposes of labor 
law; as a disruptive force in a stagnant industry, for purposes of escaping regulatory oversight; 
and as a centralized enterprise, for purposes of escaping antitrust liability. See Sanjukta Paul, 
Fissuring and the Firm Exemption, 82 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65, 66, 72–74 (2019). Paul sees a 
historic symmetry between the single entity exemption and the labor exemption to liability for 
coordinated activity under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. See id. at 67, 72. She suggests that if one 
gives way—for example, the workers in a ride-sharing enterprise are treated as independent  
contractors—the other should as well, potentially subjecting the ride-sharing enterprise to price 
fixing and related liability. See id. at 85–86. Professor Paul’s symmetry is elegant, though it  
appears unsupported by case law or commentary. Nonetheless, the Authors’ argument in this  
Article is not in real tension with Professor Paul’s approach. See infra Section IV.B. 
 143. California Proposition 22, App-Based Drivers as Contractors and Labor Policies 
Initiative (2020), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_22,_App-Based_ 
Drivers_as_Contractors_and_Labor_Policies_Initiative_(2020) [https://perma.cc/J7NE-8XH7] 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2020). 
 144. See supra notes 125–26, 131–34; see also Assemb. B. 5, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Cal. 2019). 
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labor organization to the same antitrust prohibitions that are applied 
to product markets. This is a fair summary of the judicial treatment of 
labor strikes throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
For example, in People v. Fisher, a state court interpreted a statute 
prohibiting conspiracies “[t]o commit any act injurious . . . to trade or 
commerce” to apply to a strike of cobblers in Geneva, New York.145 The 
Fisher court explained the economic effect of such a labor organization: 
If journeymen bootmakers, by extravagant demands for wages, so enhance the price 
of boots made in Geneva, for instance, that boots made elsewhere, in Auburn, for 
example, can be sold cheaper, is not such an act injurious to trade? It is surely so to 
the trade of Geneva in that particular article, and that I apprehend is all that is 
necessary to bring the offense within the statute.146 
But labor differs from other inputs in important ways. First, 
labor may be locked into relationships with one employer or a small 
number of employers due to specialized investment, education, 
training, and experience that does not have value outside of the 
particular industry. Having made that investment, or acquired that 
education, training, or experience, an individual supplier of labor loses 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the firm. In a ride-sharing market, an 
example is an Uber driver who purchased a vehicle specifically for her 
sole proprietorship driving in the Uber enterprise—what is dubbed in 
this Article as the lock-in model. Second, the labor force, like the 
population of consumers, is highly diffuse.147 In the absence of 
coordination, individual workers face a horizontal demand curve for 
their services just as any supplier in perfect competition does. Atomistic 
supply is a definitional feature of sharing economy enterprises and 
certainly characterizes ride-sharing enterprises.148  
In this way, labor markets are the mirror image of markets for 
the sale of products to consumers, although there is another 
aggravating factor unique to input markets: consumers can frequently 
opt not to participate because few consumer transactions reflect 
 
 145. People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 9, 12, 14–15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835) (quoting 2 N.Y. Rev. Stat. 
691, § 8 (1829)).  
 146. Id. at 17–18. 
 147. See Anderson & Huffman, supra note 1, at 863. These two features aggregate to the 
benefit of the buyer of labor and to the detriment of the seller. See Warren S. Grimes, Buyer Power 
and Retail Gatekeeper Power: Protecting Competition and the Atomistic Seller, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 
563, 566–69 (2005). While on the one hand the specialized training and experience might impact 
both sides of the transaction equally (replacing a worker’s experience is as difficult as the worker 
finding an alternate use for that experience), the atomistic nature of the labor market ensures an 
alternate source of supply for the buyer of labor. See id. 
 148. See Anderson & Huffman, supra note 1, at 883. 
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necessities.149 Workers less frequently have the option of declining to 
participate in the market because employment is essential to a large 
portion of the workforce.150 Labor markets thus exhibit bargaining 
disparities that may lead to underpricing labor inputs relative to  
arms-length transactions, perhaps even to a greater degree than 
consumer markets may experience overpricing.151  
Analyses of the legislative history of the Sherman Act, the 
original and primary US antitrust statute, suggest that the statute was 
not meant to cover activity by labor unions.152 Nonetheless, early 
challengers to labor organizing using antitrust laws interpreted Section 
1 of the Sherman Act to apply to and prohibit some activities by 
organized labor. In 1908, the Supreme Court held in Loewe v. Lawlor 
that a nationwide scheme of boycotts meant to facilitate the 
unionization of manufacturers of fur hats constituted a conspiracy in 
violation of Section 1.153  
Congress responded in 1914 with the Clayton Act, adding two 
sections meant to reverse the outcomes in cases like Loewe. In Section 
 
 149. See Suresh Naidu, Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Antitrust Remedies for Labor  
Market Power, 132 HARV. L. REV. 536, 538 (2018). This reality is depicted graphically with a  
downward-sloping demand curve, with a less steep slope indicating easier opt-out for consumers. 
 150. The labor market supply curve reflecting this reality would be a steeply sloping curve, 
indicating the supply will remain static even as wages are reduced. 
 151. See Naidu et al., supra note 149, at 546–47. The characteristics described here are not 
unique to labor markets. See id. at 538–39. They arise in any market where one side of the  
transaction has greater market power than the other, which is frequently the case when one side 
supplies a commodity input (product or service) and the other has a specialized use for that input. 
See id. In other such cases, exceptions to the antitrust laws may exist to allow collective action to 
correct for the bargaining disparity. See Marina Lao, Workers in the “Gig” Economy: The Case for 
Extending the Antitrust Labor Exemption, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1543, 1559 (2018). An example  
is the Capper-Volstead Act, which since 1922 has given a limited exemption for agricultural  
marketing associations. See Capper-Volstead Act, ch. 57, § 1, 42 Stat. 388, 388 (1922) (codified as 
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 291). 
 152. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 676, 700–01 (1965) (Goldberg,  
J., concurring and dissenting) (“[A] careful reading of the legislative history shows that the  
interdiction of ‘every’ contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade was not intended to 
apply to labor unions and the activities of labor unions in their own interests, aimed at promotion 
of the labor conditions of their members.”). Much of the discussion in this Section draws from the 
treatise, 9 KINTNER ET AL., supra note 124, § 72.  
 153. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 304, 306–09 (1908) (holding that the motion to dismiss 
(demurrer) should have been overruled based on the facts alleged). In one of the earliest cases, 
United States v. Workingmen’s Amalgamated Council, 54 F. 994 (C.C.E.D. La. 1893), the Federal 
Circuit Court in New Orleans held that allegations of a warehouseman’s strike with substantial 
impact on trade through the port of New Orleans stated a claim under the Sherman Act. Id. at 
999–1000. The court recognized that the concerns leading to the Sherman Act spoke to industrial 
combinations rather than labor organization, but held that the broad language of the statute as 
enacted covered labor activity as well. Id. at 996. 
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6 of the Clayton Act,154 Congress sought to define labor organization out 
of the Sherman Act prohibitions: “[t]he labor of a human being is not a 
commodity or article of commerce,” language that on its face seems to 
preclude the application of the Sherman Act, which prohibits conduct 
with regard to “trade or commerce.”155 In Section 20 of the Clayton 
Act,156 Congress prohibited the use of the remedy of injunction in the 
context of labor disputes.  
Supreme Court authorities throughout the second and third 
decades of the twentieth century frustrated “[t]hese Congressional 
provisions,”157 narrowly reading Section 6 to apply only if labor 
organizations held to “normal and legitimate objects.”158 But beginning 
in the 1930s, Congress and a changed Supreme Court breathed new life 
into an exemption from antitrust for labor organizations.159  
The modern labor exemption developed in two parallel and 
occasionally intersecting lines of authority—one, the congressional 
enactments and case law establishing the “statutory exemption,”  
and the other, a series of cases constituting the “non-statutory 
exemption.”160 More recent case law has established three requirements 
for the statutory exemption: (1) conduct of the union in the course of a 
labor dispute; (2) the union acting in its own self-interest; and (3) the 
union acting unilaterally and not in combination with nonunions.161 
 
 154. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 17). 15 U.S.C. § 17 reads in full: 
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing  
contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation 
of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes of  
mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or  
restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the  
legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held 
or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the  
antitrust laws. 
Id. 
 155. See id.; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2. Courts had long interpreted “trade” and “commerce” as  
functional synonyms. See, e.g., United States v. Patterson, 55 F. 605, 639 (C.C.D. Mass. 1893) 
(interpreting Sherman Act, Section 1). 
 156. § 20, 38 Stat. at 738 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 52). 
 157. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 702 (Goldberg, J., concurring and dissenting).  
 158. Duplex Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 469 (1921).  
 159. Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 101–15); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 227–28, 231 (1941). (“Therefore, 
whether trade union conduct constitutes a violation of the Sherman Law is to be determined only 
by reading the Sherman Law and § 20 of the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act as a 
harmonizing text of outlawry of labor conduct.”). 
 160. See generally 9 KINTNER ET AL., supra note 124, §§ 72.3, 72.7. 
 161. Id. § 72.3; H. A. Artists & Assocs. v. Actors’ Equity Ass’n, 451 U.S. 704, 714–15 (1981) 
(quoting Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 232). 
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The non-statutory labor exemption may immunize conduct even where 
the statutory exemption does not apply.162 This doctrine can be 
analogized to the Rule of Reason in antitrust, requiring a weighing of 
the competitive harm against benefits—the advancement of the public 
policy favoring labor organization—and a determination of which policy 
overbears the other.163 A holistic read of the cases establishing the  
non-statutory exemption renders the doctrine of limited use 
inapplicable to labor organization in ride-sharing. 
The crux question in the application of the statutory exemption 
in the context of sharing economy enterprises is that of the labor 
organization or union acting in the course of a labor dispute, which has 
led to holdings requiring an employment relationship.164 For example, 
the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Conley Motor Express 
v. Russell, refused to apply the statutory labor exemption to immunize 
picketing by a purported labor union of independent contractor truckers 
against the trucking enterprise to which they leased and for  
whom they drove their trucks. The court concluded the lack of the  
employer-employee relationship prevented the application of the labor 
exemption.165 
Seemingly conflicting cases leave ambiguity as to whether 
employee status definitely determines the application of the exemption. 
The Supreme Court’s 1942 decision in Columbia River Packers Ass’n v. 
Hinton166 establishes the dominant view that independent contractors 
do not have the requisite employment relationship to be eligible for the 
exemption. The plaintiff was an owner-operator of canneries in the 
Pacific Northwest. The defendants were a union of independent 
fishermen, its officers, its members, and two other fish cannery 
operations. The Court noted that the union members were independent 
 
 162. See generally 9 KINTNER ET AL., supra note 124, § 72.7; Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 310 
U.S. 469, 512–13 (1940) (assuming without explanation the inapplicability of the statutory  
exemption). In Apex Hosiery, the defendant union had sought to organize plaintiff’s employees and 
conducted a violent strike, causing substantial economic harm—conduct the Court compared to 
purely tortious or criminal action, such as “a conspiracy to derail and rob an interstate train, even 
though it were laden with 100,000 dozen pairs of stockings,” which would not implicate the  
antitrust laws despite causing the same economic harm as the strike. Id. at 482–83, 486–87. 
 163.  See FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR 
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS § 3.3 (2000), https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/ 
1098461/download [https://perma.cc/BJ8D-SEEA]. 
 164. See Conley Motor Express, Inc. v. Russell, 500 F.2d 124, 126–27 (3d Cir. 1974) (citing 
Columbia River Packers Ass’n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 145–47 (1942)) (holding that independent 
contractor truckers could not avail themselves of the statutory labor exemption because of the lack 
of an employer-employee relationship). 
 165. Conley Motor Express, 500 F.2d at 127 (“[A]ppellants have failed to show that the  
employer-employee relationship forms the matrix of their controversy with Conley.”).  
 166. Columbia River Packers Ass’n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143 (1942). 
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fishermen, who owned or leased their boats and pursued their work 
without oversight or control by the canneries. The fishermen did not 
seek employment with the plaintiff cannery operator but instead sought 
to collectively impose on the plaintiff a contract term in which the 
plaintiff agreed to only purchase fish from union members. 
Characterizing this as a “dispute among businessmen over the terms of 
a contract for the sale of fish” and not a “controversy concerning terms 
or conditions of employment, or concerning the association . . . of 
persons . . . seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment,” the 
Court determined the statutory exemption did not apply.167 
The fishermen in Columbia River Packers and workers in  
a sharing economy enterprise are highly analogous. Both service 
providers own the primary capital asset used in their work—whether 
boat or car. Both conduct their work with limited or no oversight or 
control by the enterprise with which they regularly contract.168 This 
close analogy leaves little doubt that, under the current state of the law, 
the ambiguity would be resolved against applying the labor exemption 
to organization efforts by sharing economy workers. But there is an 
important disanalogy that informs the analysis in Part V. In leading 
cases treating suppliers as contractors rather than employees, and 
therefore refusing to apply the labor exemption, the market in which 
the suppliers operate is one for the provision of goods—fish, in 
Columbia River Packers, or grease, in L.A. Meat & Provision Drivers 
Union, Local 626 v. United States—as opposed to the services at issue 
in much of the sharing economy.169  
 
 167. Id. at 144–45 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 113(c)). Courts following Columbia River Packers 
have interpreted the holding to prevent independent contractors from taking advantage of the 
statutory labor exemption. See H. A. Artists & Assocs. v. Actors’ Equity Ass’n, 451 U.S. 704, 
717 & n.20 (1981) (citing Columbia River Packers, 315 U.S. 143) (“Of course, a party seeking refuge 
in the statutory exemption must be a bona fide labor organization, and not an independent  
contractor or entrepreneur.”). An alternative approach is found in American Federation of  
Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99 (1968), where the Court considered the case of independent  
musicians establishing a set of bylaws and regulations by which they set minimum prices and 
other common contract terms for performances. The Court treated the union of musicians and 
orchestra leaders as a “labor group,” based on the “presence of a job or wage competition or some 
other economic interrelationship affecting legitimate union interests between the union members 
and the independent contractors.” Id. at 105–06. The Court found the requisite competition among 
the orchestra leaders and other musicians to establish the economic relationship needed for labor 
group status. Id. at 109–11. 
 168. Compare supra text accompanying notes 148–49, with Anderson & Huffman, supra 
note 1, at 884–85 (discussing the structure of the sharing economy enterprise). 
 169. L.A. Meat & Provision Drivers Union, Local 626 v. United States, 371 U.S. 94 (1962)). 
L.A. Meat & Provision Drivers Union involved facts strikingly similar to Columbia River Packers. 
Independent “grease peddlers,” working as middlemen in purchasing grease from restaurants and 
selling it primarily overseas, joined forces under the auspices of the defendant union to establish 
fixed purchase and sale prices for grease “for the purpose of increasing the margin between the 
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The next Part turns to an analysis of the economics underlying 
ride-sharing labor markets and how that economic story impacts 
workers and consumers. This Article reaches somewhat surprising 
conclusions that lead to the argument in Part IV for an efficiency 
defense for some ride-share-worker organizing. 
III. ECONOMIC UNDERSTANDING OF ANTITRUST IN LABOR MARKETS 
The dominant understanding of antitrust law identifies its  
goal as protecting consumers from the effects flowing from limits on 
competition, whether by the unilateral exercise of market power or by 
concerted conduct.170 However, recent commentary has challenged that 
understanding of the goals of antitrust law.171 Such alternate 
approaches have not generally been adopted.172 There is some question 
as to whether the consumer protection goal is inconsistent with worker 
protections. One perspective is that workers and consumers compete  
for surplus welfare created by voluntary transactions. Economic theory 
supports another perspective, that worker protections increase output 
in labor markets, leading to greater output and lower prices in 
consumer-facing product markets. This perspective puts both workers 
and consumers on the same side of a contest against producers.173 The 
first perspective would suggest that worker protections are inconsistent 
with antitrust law’s goal of consumer protection. The second perspective 
suggests worker protections advance those goals.  
 
prices they paid for grease and the prices at which they sold it to the processors.” Id. at 96–97. The 
defendants did not make a showing of “actual or potential wage or job competition, or of any other 
economic interrelationship, between the grease peddlers and the other members of the union.” Id. 
at 98. The Court noted: “It is also beyond question that nothing in the anti-injunction provisions 
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, nor in the labor exemption provisions of the Clayton Act, insulates a 
combination in illegal restraint of trade between businessmen and a labor union from the sanctions 
of the antitrust laws.” Id. at 99–100 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). A dissent by Justice 
Douglas argued that the union had an interest in increasing the profits to the competing  
independent grease peddlers. Id. at 110–12 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 170. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s Borderline 2, 10–11 (Aug. 11, 2020) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3656702; ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX  
107–12 (1978). 
 171. See, e.g., STEINBAUM & STUCKE, supra note 31; Wu, supra note 32. 
 172. See J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Monopsony and the Meaning of 
“Consumer Welfare”: A Closer Look at Weyerhauser, Address Before the 2006 Milton Handler  
Annual Antitrust Review (Dec. 7, 2006), in 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 353, 359–60 (stating view 
that antitrust protects consumer welfare and that challenges to monopsony must be justified by 
the effects on consumers). 
 173. See ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 
45–46 (2010) (arguing that a monopsonist buyer of labor faces higher marginal cost of labor than 
competitive buyer, reducing purchases, leading to reduced output in the downstream product or 
service market and higher consumer prices). 
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The economic effects of worker protections, including collective 
action by workers, depend in reality on market structure questions, 
including the shape of the labor market supply curve and the level of 
competition in the downstream market for sales to consumers.174 A 
labor market with an upward-sloping supply curve will respond to 
increased wage rates with increased labor output, leading to greater 
output in the consumer market. A labor market with a flat or 
downward-sloping supply curve will not respond to increased wage 
rates or may, perversely, lead to decreased labor output. In such a 
market, worker protections would lead to consumer harm. Likewise, if 
the buyer of labor lacks downstream market power it will be unable to 
pass higher costs on to consumers, while if it possesses downstream 
market power, pass-through may be possible.175 The result is that a  
sell-side exercise of labor market power may or may not offend a 
consumer-focused antitrust policy.  
This Part further examines the factors that tie labor market 
characteristics to effects in consumer markets. It begins with a closer 
look at the economic theory that explains when worker interests do and 
do not ally with consumer interests. It then discusses two types of  
ride-sharing markets, showing how different facts can influence the 
effect of worker coordination on consumers. 
A. The Concern with the Monopsonist Employer 
1. The Effect of Monopsony in Labor Markets 
A monopsony is a buyer-side monopoly.176 Monopsony power is 
the ability of a buyer to impose transaction terms that deviate from the 
competitive equilibrium.177 The monopsonist would ordinarily exercise 
market power by depressing prices.178 The ordinary effect of such 
reduced purchase prices is to reduce the quantity purchased, reducing 
in turn the production capacity and output in the consumer market.179 
This is particularly the case where the monopsonist also possesses 
 
 174. See Jonathan M. Jacobson, Monopsony 2013: Still Not Truly Symmetric, ANTITRUST 
SOURCE, Dec. 2013, at 3–5 (flat or downward-sloping input supply curves may decouple exercises 
of monopsony power from price increases to consumers).  
 175. See infra Sections III.A.2, IV.B. 
 176. BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 173, at 41.  
 177. Id. at 48. 
 178. Roger G. Noll, “Buyer Power” and Economic Policy, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 589, 589 (2005). 
 179. BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 173. Blair and Harrison note that the demand  
elasticity of other purchasers may be asymmetrical in any given industry depending on competing 
manufacturers’ cost structures. Id. at 59. For example, if a competing manufacturer was near its 
maximum efficient production capacity, it would have low elasticity of demand. 
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monopoly power in the consumer market, so reduced output and 
increased prices to consumers do not attract competitive entry.180  
A traditional conception of a vertically structured supply chain 
might involve a diffuse input market for labor or raw materials, a 
concentrated production market with a single or a few large factories, 
and diffuse downstream markets for distribution and consumption—a 
bell curve of relative concentration that involves both monopsony 
purchasing and monopoly selling. Such a vertical supply chain would 
theoretically result in greater profits for the monopsonist or monopolist 
at the shared expense of the input sellers (who are paid less than the 
competitive price) and the consumers (who are charged more than the 
competitive price).181 
Not every vertical supply chain bears those characteristics. 
Initially, a buyer of inputs, such as an employer purchasing labor or a 
sharing economy platform contracting with workers, may or may not 
have monopsony power due to several possible counterweights. These 
include elasticity of supply: the more easily supply inputs can be 
repurposed to other industries, the less likely high concentration in 
manufacture will confer monopsony power.182 There is also the 
possibility of countervailing seller power, whether unilateral or 
collusive: concentration or coordination in the input (or labor) market 
can create bilateral monopoly power, offsetting monopsony power that 
might otherwise exist.183 A third possible corrective might be regulatory 
protections in the input market, such as minimum price legislation. 
 
 180. Id. at 48. 
 181. See Catherine C. de Fontenay & Joshua S. Gans, Can Vertical Integration by a  
Monopsonist Harm Consumer Welfare?, 22 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 821, 822 (2004); see also Apple Inc. 
v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1525 (2019). In an industry with these characteristics, consumers’ and 
workers’ interests are aligned. 
 182. BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 173, at 58. 
 183. See generally id. at 123–45. Paradoxically, collective action by workers can  
increase the benefit to consumers. Eric A. Posner, The Economic Basis of the Independent  
Contractor/Employee Distinction 15–16 (June 6, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=3582673. If a buyer of labor has monopsony power, it will reduce the 
quantity it purchases in order to drive down the price it pays. Id. at 12–13. This reduction in the 
price of labor does not help consumers since it coincides with a reduction in quantity. This  
reduction in quantity may or may not hurt consumers. If the labor buyer has market power as a 
seller, the reduction in quantity will hurt consumers since the quantity reduction will increase 
prices in the sale market. See Naidu et al., supra note 149, at 559–60. If the monopsonist buyer of 
labor does not have power in the selling market, quantity in the selling market will be made up by 
other sellers increasing quantity. This strategy can still be profitable to the monopsonist since the 
reduction in its purchase price of labor can be sufficient to more than offset the reduction in  
quantity sold. See id. at 556. 
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Regulatory protections (minimum wages, health care requirements) are 
a frequent characteristic of labor markets.184  
Second, even in the case of a buyer with monopsony power, such 
power may or may not coincide with monopoly in the downstream 
market. In its most recent antitrust monopsony decision, Weyerhauser 
Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., the Court recognized the 
possibility of upstream market power for the purchase of logs, the most 
elementary input into wood product processing, due to the localized 
nature of that market. Downstream sales for processed lumber, 
however, are more likely to be made in national markets.185 Another 
example might be markets with differing elasticities, with inelastic 
supply for inputs supporting monopsony power but elastic demand for 
products undermining monopoly power.186 A lack of monopoly power 
reduces the likelihood that exercise of monopsony power can harm 
consumers. If exercise of buyer power reduces input costs, downstream 
competition may ensure those cost reductions benefit consumers.187  
The general economic principles hold whether inputs are 
widgets or labor. A monopsonist employer, or a firm that contracts with 
labor inputs and enjoys the requisite concentration and supply-side 
inelasticity necessary to produce monopsony power, may negotiate 
below-equilibrium wages.188 There is some evidence that the degree of 
concentration required for monopsony may be less than that usually 
required in the case of monopoly.189 Monopsony in labor markets  
can be market-wide, such as a sole employer in a given geographic  
market—the company town. It can also be specific to the working 
relationship. Eric Posner describes the phenomenon of “relational 
work,” where the laborer makes relationship-specific investments in the 
buyer of labor and bears a substantial opportunity cost of shifting to 
 
 184. See Lao, supra note 151, at 1575–76. 
 185. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 321 & n.2 
(2007). Logs, which are expensive to transport, are sold in localized geographic markets, while 
lumber is more likely to be sold in national markets. See BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 173, at 58 
(buyer power partly determined by market share). 
 186. See BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 173, at 58–59 (“[A]s the elasticity of supply  
increases, the [buyer power index] falls.”). 
 187. This is not true in all circumstances if, for example, competing producers are  
already manufacturing at efficient levels, such that marginal production is more expensive. 
BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 173; see also infra Section III.A.2. 
 188. Posner, supra note 183, at 12. 
 189. See Monopsony Issues in Agriculture: Buying Power of Processors in Our Nation’s  
Agricultural Markets: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 70 (2003)  
[hereinafter Hearing on Monopsony Issues in Agriculture] (statement of Peter C. Carstensen, 
George Young-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School) (identifying 10  
percent or more as sufficient share to have market impacts); see generally PETER C. CARSTENSEN, 
COMPETITION POLICY AND THE CONTROL OF BUYER POWER: A GLOBAL ISSUE (2017). 
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another buyer. Posner describes a worker who, through concentrating 
efforts on a particular job with a particular buyer of labor, acquires 
skills that are more valuable to that buyer than to any other. Such a 
laborer is “locked in” to the relationship with that buyer, granting the 
buyer some amount of monopsony power.190 
The lock-in concept that Posner identifies in labor markets has 
analogs in input markets across the economy. Any large, single-purpose 
investment in an input will lock the investor into a long-term 
relationship with the buyer. This is frequent in the case of an industrial 
parts supplier, who might make, for example, a specific automobile part 
designed to specifications provided by the buyer, an automobile 
manufacturer. The supplier’s entire enterprise, including the factory, 
machinery, training of employees, and contracts for inputs, may well be 
specific to the relationship with the automobile manufacturer. That 
supplier has no realistic exit option from its relationship with the 
manufacturer. Another example is a railroad, which—once having  
laid tracks—is committed to relationships with geographically 
proximate users of its track. Both of these are in contrast to the supplier 
of a commodity input, such as raw materials, that can easily be 
repurposed for other uses and shipped to other buyers. Posner identifies 
a labor-market analog to the commodity input in the form of a worker 
with easily repurposed skills.191 
There are two primary differences between labor-market 
monopsonies and those found in other input markets. Initially, the 
possibility of lock-in due to relationship-specific investments is more 
likely to occur in labor markets, as education, experience, regulatory 
barriers such as occupational licensing, and barriers to exit make 
mobility for workers more difficult than for commodity inputs. In 
addition, labor-market monopsony differs from other input markets in 
terms of a perception of the human cost.192 Complementary legal 
schemes operate to correct for real or perceived monopsony power  
in labor markets. These include federal and state wage-and-hour 
 
 190. Posner, supra note 183, at 12. This Article expands on the concept of “lock-in” in  
Section III.B, infra, and its implications for antitrust analysis in Section IV.B. 
 191. Posner, supra note 183, at 10. 
 192. Discussions of labor rights consistently reflect greater concern for individuals selling 
labor as distinct from individuals selling products produced by their labor. It is not obvious that 
one is more or less deserving or needing of legal protection in transactions with a monopsonist 
than the other.  
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protections,193 federal labor law granting rights to organize,194 and 
exemptions from antitrust prohibitions that permit labor organization 
without it being treated as cartel conduct.195 
2. Do Workers and Consumers Compete for Economic Surplus? 
Worker protections initially seem to conflict with antitrust law’s 
goal of consumer protection. Under one view, a welfare gain realized  
in a voluntary transaction can be divided among three competing 
claimants: owners, workers, and consumers. In the case of the sharing 
economy the claimants are the platform, the workers, and the 
consumers. Surplus captured by the workers would reduce wealth 
available for consumers.196 
An alternative view is that worker protections go hand in  
hand with consumer welfare. This argument turns on the belief that 
increases in pay or benefits to workers bring supply into the market. 
The increase in inputs changes the profit-maximizing output decisions 
by the employer or platform, leading to an increase in output and a 
commensurate decrease in the price paid by consumers.197 An extreme 
statement of this view concludes that worker protections serve both 
labor protection and antitrust goals at once, while also keeping costs in 
check for owners.198 
 
 193. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 6, 52 Stat. 1060, 1062–63 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206) (establishing federal minimum wage); e.g. Minimum Wage Act, ch. 
294, § 2, 1959 Wash. Sess. Laws 1411, 1413 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 49.46.020 
(2020)) (establishing Washington State minimum wage). 
 194. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 151–69). 
 195. Clayton Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17. 
 196. See Balmoral Cinema v. Allied Artists Pictures, 885 F.2d 313, 316–17 (6th Cir. 1989) 
(suggesting that a buyer-side agreement not to engage in competitive bidding “may lower prices to 
moviegoers at the box office”); cf. Alan Devlin, Questioning the Per Se Standard in Cases of  
Concerted Monopsony, 3 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 223, 230–31 (2007) (quoting Hearing on Monopsony 
Issues in Agriculture, supra note 189, at 159 (statement of R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Att’y Gen., 
Antitrust Division, Department of Justice)). Jacobson points out that a number of courts have 
relied on this heuristic when declining to apply antitrust laws with equal force in the context of 
monopsony power as in the context of monopoly power. Jacobson, supra note 174, at 1–2, 6. 
 197. This effect is not unique to labor inputs. For example, the 2010 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines describe a possibly harmful merger as one that creates a monopsony, “inefficiently  
reducing supply . . . even if the merger will not lead to any increase in the price charged by the 
merged firm for its output.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL  
MERGER GUIDELINES 33 (2010), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NZ35-6G8P]. 
 198. Cf. Randy M. Stutz, The Evolving Antitrust Treatment of Labor-Market  
Restraints: From Theory to Practice, AM. ANTITRUST INST., at 2–3, 2 n.5 (July 31, 2018), 
https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/AAI-Labor-Antitrust-White-
Paper_0-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/QG34-SKR9] (interpreting scholarship to conclude that  
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Neither view is categorically correct. Workers bargain with the 
firm (or the platform) over wages. If the labor market is characterized 
by an upward-sloping supply curve, the profit-maximizing decision by 
the firm (or platform) is to reduce the price paid for labor, which, in 
turn, reduces the amount of labor supplied. A reduction in labor inputs 
to the firm (or platform) reduces the amount of product or service it can 
create. This, in turn, leads to consumer harm with reduced output and 
commensurately increased prices to consumers. Under such market 
conditions, protections for workers, whether regulated transaction 
terms such as minimum wages or rights to engage in collective action 
such as unionizing, can—by moving the price closer to the competitive 
level, bringing more supply into the market, and increasing the output 
in consumer markets—benefit consumers as well as workers.199  
In contrast, if the labor supply curve is vertical or even 
downward sloping in the relevant price range, increasing the price of 
labor would not increase the quantity supplied in the input market.200 
Instead, with supply static, or perhaps decreasing in the rare 
circumstance of a downward-sloping labor supply curve, increasing the 
price of labor would increase production costs but not increase output 
in the consumer market.201 This leads to consumer harm, though 
competition in the downstream market may mitigate that harm by 
limiting the firm’s (or platform’s) ability to increase prices to 
consumers.202 Some reason exists to believe this is the more likely 
description of labor markets across broad swaths of the US economy.203  
 
bargaining power exerted on the buyer side can reduce price paid for inputs, thereby reducing the 
quantity of inputs supplied, thus raising the marginal cost of production, leading to increased 
prices for consumers). In fact, the result Stutz identifies can only arise in the presence of a number 
of assumptions about the market, including an upward-sloping labor supply curve and lack of 
market power in the consumer market. See Devlin, supra note 196, at 232. 
 199. See Posner, supra note 183. In most real-world industries, this impact will exist  
regardless of monopoly power or its lack in the consumer market because the increase in output 
will displace higher-cost competitors. 
 200. There is some question whether one would ever identify a vertical labor supply curve 
in a real-world setting. The Authors note below the possibility of a C-shaped curve, which has been 
identified in scholarship on subsistence-wage markets, and under this condition the middle of the 
curve reflects a state in which marginal supply is on net inelastic (likely represented by low-wage 
workers exiting as their capacity is exhausted while new entrants enter in response to price  
increases). See infra Section III.B.2. 
 201. See Jacobson, supra note 174, at 5 (citing ROBERT PINDYCK & DANIEL RUBINFELD, 
MICROECONOMICS 377–78 (7th ed. 2009)).  
 202. Unless the consumer-facing market is perfectly competitive, the Authors would expect 
an increase in the price charged by the manufacturer to lead to higher cost competitors entering 
the market, with the overall effect being higher prices and lower output. 
 203. See infra Section IV.A.3. 
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B. Workers in the Sharing Economy Enterprise 
The sharing economy enterprise structure, through which 
consumers and workers contract over a platform, means that erstwhile 
competitors for consumer transactions may fail to compete while also 
not joining forces in a traditional antitrust firm.204 In addition to 
workers transacting with consumers, they enter into transactions  
with the platform itself. Those transactions entail an allocation of 
responsibility for the supply side of the ride-sharing transaction. 
Workers provide labor and capital in the form of a compliant 
automobile. Platforms provide a host of services, most notably the 
software—the “app” through which workers encounter consumers in 
what is normally an efficient, safe, and reliable manner—as well as 
services including (1) safe and efficient payment processing; (2) the 
management of the pricing algorithm; (3) rentals or leases of the 
automobile;205 and (4) access to insurance.206 
At its core, the sharing economy enterprise integrates workers 
and the platform through which they collectively offer services to 
consumers.207 As Part II discusses above, from the beginning, this has 
presented labor and employment issues, with the firms providing the 
app seeking to avoid employing the workers and providing attendant 
benefits and protections and the workers seeking those benefits and 
protections. Seen through the lens of labor economics outlined 
immediately above, workers’ status as employees or contractors is less 
important than the shape of the labor-market supply curve and the 
degree of competition in the downstream market for providing rides to 
consumers.208  
Those questions, in turn, are fact bound and depend on the 
specifics of a particular geographic market. At one extreme, one can 
 
 204. Anderson & Huffman, supra note 1, at 291. 
 205. At one time Uber financed auto purchases, although that service is no longer identified 
on the Uber website. See Molly Wood, Uber Drivers Struggle to Pay Subprime Auto Loans, 
MARKETPLACE (May 13, 2015), https://www.marketplace.org/2015/05/13/uber-drivers-struggle-
pay-subprime-auto-loans/ [https://perma.cc/38D7-4RPA]. 
 206. See John Egan & Amy Danise, Rideshare Insurance for Uber and Lyft Drivers, FORBES 
ADVISOR (Dec. 18, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/advisor/car-insurance/rideshare-insur-
ance/ [https://perma.cc/T8ED-3M3M]. 
 207. Anderson & Huffman, supra note 1, at 870 (defining “sharing economy enterprise”). 
The Authors’ characterization is not entirely uncontroversial. Ride-sharing platforms more often 
describe themselves as independent of both sides of the match, no more integrated with the drivers 
than with the riders. 
 208. There is an alternative understanding of the platform-driver relationship that may 
command a different result. Professor Akman has analyzed the platform enterprise through the 
lens of agency law, treating the platform as a service provider. Pinar Akman, Online Platforms, 
Agency, and Competition Law: Mind the Gap, 43 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 209, 277–78 (2019). 
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imagine a market in which ride-sharing workers are best described by 
the fallow-assets model, with otherwise employed individuals, students, 
or retirees, who already own their vehicles, using spare time before or 
after work to earn extra money. Speaking based on personal anecdote, 
Huffman has described the ride-sharing market in Indianapolis, 
Indiana, in this way. The fallow assets these workers contribute to the 
enterprise are their existing automobiles and their leisure time. 
Reports of the entrepreneurial idea underlying the sharing economy 
suggest this was what the worker platform developers envisioned.  
At the other extreme, one can imagine a market in which  
ride-sharing workers are best described by the locked-in model,  
with individuals who have made nearly irrevocable commitments to  
ride-sharing as a source of revenue.209 Those individuals are likely 
otherwise unemployed or marginally employed. They may have 
relocated geographically in reliance on the opportunity to earn money 
as a ride-sharing driver. They frequently have not previously owned a 
compliant automobile and have financed their automobile—perhaps 
even through Uber—based on the expectation of its use in  
ride-sharing.210 Anderson, based on personal anecdote, has described 
the ride-sharing market in Seattle, Washington, in this way. More 
recent empirical studies of large ride-sharing markets suggest the 
locked-in model is more characteristic of the industry as it has 
developed over the past decade.211 
In reality, of course, any given geographic market is populated 
by a range of drivers, with some markets predominated by one model 
and others predominated by the other. Which model accurately 
 
 209. The Authors concentrate in this Article on ride-sharing as both the best-known and 
the purest expression of a sharing economy enterprise. The lessons the Authors draw in their  
research also inform other sharing economy enterprises. Lodging services through Airbnb, 
https://www.airbnb.com/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2020), and task services through TaskRabbit, 
https://www.taskrabbit.com/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2020), both are most likely to fit the  
fallow-assets model rather than the locked-in model. Two fundamental differences drive the  
analysis of these alternative platforms. First, in both cases the services offered are substantially 
less commodified than in the case of ride-sharing. Second, in both cases suppliers in the respective 
enterprises are substantially less likely to have made irrevocable commitments. These two  
together place home-sharing and task services in the fallow-assets, rather than lock-in, model. The 
result is that organization among suppliers to these enterprises is likely to present an efficiency if 
there is a concern for monopsony on the part of the platform. The Authors do not investigate that 
question further, but intuition suggests the existence of monopsony in those industries is unlikely. 
 210. Drive, UBER, https://www.uber.com/in/en/drive/vehicle-solutions/ [https://perma.cc/ 
9X97-LDSK] (last visited Mar. 11, 2021) (describing options for purchasing a car, leasing a car, or 
joining a fleet of cars owned by others). 
 211. See Jaclyn Severance, NYC Ridesharing Study Has Implications for Policymakers, 
UCONN TODAY (July 8, 2019), https://today.uconn.edu/2019/07/surprising-nyc-ridesharing-study-
findings-transit-climate-implications-policymakers-uconn-researchers-say/# [https://perma.cc/ 
UZ86-FHU8]. 
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characterizes a particular enterprise in a particular geographic market 
depends on which model predominates. This, in turn, informs the 
antitrust question of worker organization. Relevant facts to distinguish 
between the model to be applied include the size of the investment or 
other commitment required to enter the market; the revocability of the 
investment or other commitment required to enter the market; and 
alternative choices available to workers in the market. Of course, any 
geographic market includes drivers who fit each model. The difference 
between markets is which type of driver predominates at the margin. 
The remainder of this Section analyzes these two hypothetical  
ride-sharing markets in terms of their likely structure and the expected 
economic impact of conduct at the level of the workers and at the level 
of the platform. It concludes that, perversely, the strongest economic 
case for labor protections arises in markets defined by the fallow-assets 
model, although the greatest need for labor protections appears to arise 
in markets defined by the lock-in model.  
1. Fallow Assets: The “Indianapolis” Market 
Workers in a fallow-assets model use existing property and free 
time to provide services in exchange for revenue. The main costs to the 
workers are gas, wear and tear on their cars, and the value of their 
leisure time. This worker enters the market only when the revenue to 
be gained exceeds those costs and exits as soon as the calculus changes. 
Early descriptions of ride-sharing as an economic innovation tended to 
highlight the fallow-assets model as describing likely suppliers in  
the enterprises.212 Based on anecdotal observations by the Authors,  
ride-sharing workers in Indianapolis seem to fit this model—frequently 
driving cars that they previously owned and driving before or after work 
or on the weekends.  
A fallow-assets worker has made only limited commitment to the 
ride-sharing enterprise as a source of income.213 The assets to be 
deployed—the car and the leisure time—are “discrete,” in Professor 
Posner’s words,214 and can either be repurposed for other uses or can be 
 
 212. See Jonathan V. Hall & Alan B. Krueger, An Analysis of the Labor Market for Uber’s 
Driver-Partners in the United States 9 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 22843, 
2016). 
 213. A recent study of IRS tax returns concludes that the sharing economy has not  
increased the incidence of individuals earning their primary income as a contractor. Brett  
Collins, Andrew Garin, Emilie Jackson, Dmitri Koustas & Mark Payne, Is Gig Work Replacing 
Traditional Employment? Evidence from Two Decades of Tax Returns 13 (Mar. 25, 2019)  
(unpublished manuscript), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/19rpgigworkreplacingtraditionalem-
ployment.pdf?smid=nytcore-ios-share [https://perma.cc/TA39-JXJZ]. 
 214. Posner, supra note 183, at 4. 
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returned to the prior state of nonuse. Fallow-assets workers can enter 
and exit the sharing economy marketplace as their needs and interests 
change. In particular, the value of the automobile and the leisure time 
changes on the basis of competing events for these workers. For 
example, when a fallow-assets worker wishes to schedule a family road 
trip, the car and leisure time become more valuable, and the worker can 
step out of the sharing economy marketplace until the road trip is 
complete. In contrast, when the fallow-assets driver gains unexpected 
leisure time or finds the car unexpectedly unused, the driver can enter 
the sharing economy market. Likewise, when the earnings available by 
driving increase, perhaps because the number of consumers outpaces 
the number of drivers at a particular time, the fallow-assets worker can 
enter the market for as long as doing so is valuable.215  
In a fallow-assets model, the output of driving services is highly 
susceptible to the available earnings. If the platform adjusts the 
payment algorithm to shift a greater percentage of the earnings to the 
workers, one would expect to see a larger number of fallow-assets 
workers participate in the market, each devoting a larger proportion  
of their leisure time. This effect occurs because the driver has an  
upward-sloping supply curve. Aggregating those individual curves into 
a market curve would likewise produce a relatively smooth upward 
slope, comparable to textbook examples of labor markets.216  
As Section III.A explains, in this market, in the absence of wage 
discrimination, a buyer with monopsony power will offer less than the 
competitive equilibrium wage rate and buy less than the competitive 
equilibrium output, leading to output reductions in the consumer 
market as well.217 Collective action by the workers creates 
countervailing power which can raise the price and increase the output 
of labor provided back toward the competitive level. This scenario can 
justify joint negotiation by the drivers with the platforms over the terms 
of their working relationship—in particular, over the price charged for 
the rides and over the share of the price received by the drivers.  
Section IV.B applies these lessons about the fallow-assets model 
to show that organization by drivers in such a market, with the effect 
of increasing the earnings for drivers, could reflect an efficiency that 
might justify an agreement to organize under an application of the 
structured Rule of Reason. This recognition might provide some 
 
 215. The Authors note above that other sharing economy enterprises, including Airbnb and 
TaskRabbit, are most likely to characterized by the fallow-assets model. See supra text  
accompanying note 209. This is due to the lesser likelihood of irrevocable commitments. 
 216. See generally ROBERT PINDYCK & DANIEL RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS (9th ed. 
2018). 
 217. BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 173, at 45–46. See also supra Section III.A.1. 
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optimism about the possibility of labor organization in the ride-sharing 
context, but this optimism is muted. The drivers best able to make such 
an efficiency argument are also those least likely to depend on 
organizing because of their lack of lock-in. 
2. Lock-In: The “Seattle” Market 
The second model is the “locked-in” model, with workers that 
have made irrevocable, relationship-specific investments or other 
commitments to providing their services.218 For example, a locked-in 
worker might likely have purchased a car specifically for ride-sharing 
use, may have left other work that was believed to be less remunerative, 
and, at the extreme, may have relocated to a market where sharing 
economy work was likely to be more remunerative. This worker meets 
Professor Posner’s definition of a “relational worker.”219 Anecdotal 
observations by the authors are that the Seattle ride-sharing market is 
populated by locked-in drivers.220 
These workers are committed to ride-sharing both as a means 
for support and as a means for discharging obligations incurred in order 
to enter the marketplace. The clearest illustration of the lock-in is the 
car, which both depreciates rapidly and has a lower value in other uses. 
Exiting the marketplace by selling the car would, at a minimum, cause 
a substantial loss to the worker and might well leave the worker with a 
deficiency obligation to the auto lender and no means to make payment. 
Recent popular press accounts of purchase transactions tied to service 
contracts support the hypothesis. An NPR report on Uber’s now-defunct 
financing program suggests a car sale to facilitate driving on the Uber 
 
 218. The phenomenon of “lock-in” is not uncommon on the buyer side in consumer markets, 
with consumers locked in to a relationship with a particular seller creating some degree of  
monopoly power. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs. Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 476–77 
(1992) (reasoning that locked-in buyers, due to the large and unrecoverable investment in office 
photocopy equipment, create market power in the aftermarket). 
 219. See Posner, supra note 183, at 4. 
 220. Other largely urban markets also seem to bear these characteristics. See, e.g.,  
Kalmanovitz Initiative for Lab. & the Working Poor, The Uber Workplace in D.C., GEO. UNIV. 7–9 
(2020) (identifying debt burden to enter the marketplace in 33 percent of drivers in  
Washington, DC), https://lwp.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/319/uploads/Uber-Work-
place.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PED-QFHK]. Competing studies offer different analyses of the actual 
outcomes for ride-sharing workers in Seattle, and it is possible a different geographic market is a 
better exemplar. See Tina Bellon, Study Suggests Most Uber, Lyft Drivers in Seattle Not  
Poorly Paid, REUTERS (July 8, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-seattle-pay/study-
suggests-most-uber-lyft-drivers-in-seattle-not-poorly-paid-idUSKBN2493CG [https://perma.cc/ 
32EE-P3LH] (citing Louis Hyman et al., Platform Driving in Seattle, CORNELL ILR SCH. INST. FOR 
WORKPLACE STUD. (July 6, 2020) (finding median earnings after expenses of $23.95 hourly, with 
92 percent of drivers making more than the city minimum wage for Seattle of $16.39)). The most 
recent study was funded by a grant from Uber and Lyft. 
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platform resulted in the driver being locked into driving, at risk of 
defaulting on the loan.221  
After the up-front investment to enter the marketplace, the 
locked-in worker’s opportunity cost of providing services is limited to 
their leisure time. This worker is price insensitive, participating in the 
market so long as the amount to be earned exceeds the value of an  
hour of leisure time. The effect of this price insensitivity is that an 
algorithmic reduction in compensation is unlikely to dramatically 
reduce the amount of work offered either by the individual or across the 
market. Instead, reducing the amount earned by the driver may reduce 
the platform’s cost of offering services without reducing the volume of 
output by workers, benefitting consumers of ride-sharing services. 
It is even possible to theorize a below-break-even effect in which 
output increases. Below the break-even price point, the first action for 
locked-in drivers is to increase their output as needed to cover fixed 
costs, producing a C-shaped supply curve, previously identified in 
developing economies with earnings below the subsistence level.222 This 
increased output in response to reduced prices would continue to a point 
defined by limits on drivers’ capacity. This effect would hold for more 
than the short term because of the irrevocable commitment to the 
enterprise, driven largely by the payoff price of the automobile.223 
The lesson from this description of the locked-in model is that 
there is no consumer benefit to be gained from coordination among 
drivers to raise the price of their services. Any such coordination would 
not dramatically increase output, but it would raise the costs of their 
services to consumers. Locked-in workers would have lesser success in 




 221. Wood, supra note 205. A similar example, also reported by NPR, relates to  
lease-to-own transactions in long-haul trucking. Keith Romer & Sarah Gonzalez, Big Rigged, 
PLANET MONEY (Aug. 14, 2020, 3:31 PM), https://www.npr.org/transcripts/901110994 
[https://perma.cc/L3KL-LSRB]. 
 222. Cf. Purnamita Dasgupta & Bishwanath Goldar, Female Labor Supply in Rural  
India: An Econometric Analysis, 49 INDIAN J. LAB. ECON. 293, 294 (2006) (“The bottom segment of 
the curve is downward sloping (or forward falling), which implies that if the wage level is low, then 
any further decline in wage rate may lead to increase in the supply of labour.”).  
 223. At some price level, any irrevocable commitment will induce individuals to increase 
output of labor as needed to cover committed expenses. Across a particular labor market, it will be 
unusual to find sufficient uniformity to produce an aggregate response that reflects a market  
supply curve with this characteristic. The commonality of enterprise-specific investments in a  
ride-sharing market increases the likelihood that such a market will be represented by a supply 
curve with a rightward downward slope below a certain minimum labor price point. 
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IV. RECONCILING ANTITRUST DOCTRINE WITH SHARING ECONOMY 
LABOR MARKET REALITIES 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act has been interpreted to give rise to 
both categorical rules and matter of degree rules.224 The per se rule 
against price fixing, the single entity rule, and the labor exemption are 
all categorical. They attempt to define a factual category that leads to a 
legal outcome. The Rule of Reason, with its complex allocation of 
burdens, focuses on the degree to which competition has been 
restrained or advanced. As the Supreme Court has eliminated or 
limited per se rules, it has stated a preference for the matter of degree 
approach embodied in the Rule of Reason.225  
In addressing whether drivers should be allowed to jointly 
negotiate with platform companies, the law could rely on a categorical 
rule such as the labor exemption or the matter of degree rules embodied 
in the Rule of Reason. Using the labor exemption would require defining 
the category of workers who are entitled to the exemption and may 
require altering the current definition of that category. Using the Rule 
of Reason would require determining that the per se rule against price 
fixing should not apply, as well as determining how the multistep 
analysis of the Rule of Reason should be applied in this situation. 
Section IV.A examines several attempts by other scholars to apply a 
categorical rule in this context. Section IV.B argues that the matter of 
degree rules embodied in the Rule of Reason are better suited to the 
task of determining when drivers should be allowed to jointly negotiate 
since it can apply the economic insight that is developed in Part III. 
A. Altering the Labor Exemption 
Recent analyses of the problem presented here produce three 
divergent approaches to accommodating collective bargaining by 
 
 224. A categorical rule defines a legal outcome based on a set of elements that are fixed. A 
matter of degree rule defines a legal outcome based on one or more variables that vary on a  
spectrum. Some policies are advanced by rules of each type. For example, a policy of traffic safety 
is advanced by categorical rules like speed limits. A sixty mile-per-hour speed limit promotes  
traffic safety with one fixed, easily defined element. The policy of traffic safety is also promoted by 
a matter of degree rule such as a prohibition on driving too fast for the conditions. One advantage 
of a categorical rule is that it is easy to apply. A disadvantage of a categorical rule is that it can be 
both over- and underinclusive. Rules focused on matters of degree attempt to sort those different 
actors out based on a multiplicity of factors. The disadvantages of the matter of degree rules are 
that they are difficult to apply and to predict. 
 225. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885–86 
(2007) (overruling prior per se rule for resale price maintenance in favor of a Rule of Reason  
analysis); Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (same for vertical market 
allocation agreements). 
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sharing economy workers over the terms of their relationships with the 
platform. One approach, best stated in a 2018 article by Marina Lao, is 
to uncouple the concept of employment for the labor exemption from 
that used in state law for other purposes.226 This would continue to  
treat sharing economy workers as contractors for purposes of state 
employment law but treat them as employees for purposes of the labor 
exemption governing collective bargaining.227 A second approach, best 
outlined in a forthcoming article by Eric Posner, recognizes that the 
historic control test for employee status is inconsistent with modern 
economic realities, which can reduce or eliminate the practical 
distinctions between contractors and employees.228 Hiba Hafiz outlines 
a third approach, which touches largely tangentially on the unique 
circumstance of the sharing economy, seeking to integrate labor 
protections with antitrust law through an agency cooperation scheme, 
as well as the development of substantive presumptions requiring 
attention to worker interests.229 For different reasons, the Authors do 
not believe any of these three approaches appropriately resolve the 
problems of how antitrust law should apply to sharing economy 
workers. 
1. Uncoupling Bargaining Rights from State Law Employment 
Professor Marina Lao argues for two legal outcomes for drivers 
in ride-sharing enterprises. First, Professor Lao argues that drivers for 
ride-share companies should not be treated as employees for all 
purposes.230 Second, she argues that the drivers should be covered by 
the labor exemption to the Sherman Act and allowed to collectively 
negotiate with the platform companies.231 Professor Lao begins her 
analysis by recognizing the efficiency-enhancing potential of sharing 
economy platforms.232 Her conclusion that drivers should not be treated 
as employees for all purposes is based on her assessment that granting 
drivers all of the rights of employees could destroy the platform 
companies and their efficiencies by imposing excessively rigid 
 
 226. Lao, supra note 151, at 1583–86. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Posner, supra note 183, at 27. 
 229. See Hafiz, supra note 35. 
 230. Lao, supra note 151, at 1574. 
 231. Id. at 1567–68. 
 232. Id. at 1550–51. 
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requirements related to compensation and scheduling, as well as other 
terms of employment.233 
Professor Lao’s second conclusion, that the drivers should be 
covered by the labor exemption, requires more discussion. Professor Lao 
begins by characterizing gig economy workers as straddling the line 
between employees and independent contractors.234 In doing so, she 
states the importance of the control that one party has over the other.235 
Ride-share drivers control when and how much they work and whether 
they have other jobs or work for other ride-sharing enterprises.236 
Professor Lao concludes that this level of control by the driver is 
inconsistent with characterization as an employee.237 However, she 
points out that drivers do not have control over the price that they 
charge.238 Price is, of course, a crucial aspect of any sale transaction. 
Professor Lao discusses four situations in which the Supreme 
Court or antitrust enforcement authorities concluded that the Sherman 
Act should apply to workers facing powerful buyers. In Columbia River 
Packers,239 the Court applied the Sherman Act to fishermen who sold 
fish to packers and claimed to have formed a union to negotiate on their 
behalf.240 In L.A. Meat & Provision Drivers Union,241 the Court similarly 
applied the Sherman Act to sellers of reclaimed cooking grease who 
claimed to have formed a union to jointly negotiate with purchasers.242 
The Court faced a similar combination of workers in Superior Court 
Trial Lawyers,243 where attorneys providing indigent criminal defense 
in the District of Columbia went on strike for higher compensation. The 
Court had no trouble concluding that this combination was illegal price 
fixing.244 Finally, Professor Lao discusses the long-standing position of 
federal antitrust enforcement authorities condemning combinations  
of physicians formed to collectively negotiate with health insurance 
 
 233. Id. at 1575–76. Professor Lao’s argument about the reality of imposing obligations to 
comply with employment laws on the ride-sharing platforms is given support by the announcement 
by Uber that it would leave the California market in response to state legislation defining its  
drivers as employees. See Conger, supra note 142. 
 234. Lao, supra note 151, at 1553–58. 
 235. Id. at 1554–56. 
 236. Id. at 1555–56. 
 237. Id. at 1556. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Columbia River Packers Ass’n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143 (1942). 
 240. Id. at 145. 
 241. L.A. Meat & Provision Drivers Union, Local 626 v. United States, 371 U.S. 94 (1962). 
 242. Id. at 98–101. 
 243. FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 414–18 (1990). 
 244. Id. at 436 n.19. 
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plans.245 Professor Lao argues that granting antitrust immunity to 
drivers for ride-sharing enterprises is consistent with the rationales of 
these cases.246 
According to Lao, Congress enacted the labor exemption to 
protect the economic interests of workers who would suffer in a pure 
market economy:  
The premise of the antitrust law is that competition is generally best for the 
economy, as competition is expected to “produce not only lower prices, but also better 
goods and services.” The role of the Sherman Act, then, is to protect the marketplace 
from unreasonable interference, whether through price fixing or other forms of 
restraints on competition. Since collective bargaining by workers for higher pay and 
better working conditions does interfere with the ordinary workings of the labor 
market and is a form of price-fixing, it would seem to fall within the antitrust law’s 
prohibitions. 
However, society obviously has other values, in addition to marketplace competition, 
that are worthy of protection—such as the fair treatment of workers . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . Essentially, the exemption expresses a philosophy that labor markets are 
different from other types of markets, and that the value of competition underlying 
our antitrust laws must accommodate the value of empowering workers in seeking 
fair wages and good working conditions.247 
She argues that the sellers of fish and kitchen grease were  
more like independent businesspeople than drivers in ride-sharing 
enterprises because they have more autonomy than the drivers and, 
further, in the absence of the challenged collusion, would be market 
participants competing with each other.248  
Professor Lao distinguishes the doctors’ situation first by noting 
that doctors have substantial incomes so a policy allowing collusion to 
achieve better income does not apply.249 She also notes that while 
doctors often complain about control asserted by insurance companies, 
that control does not equal that of an employer over an employee.250 
Further, Professor Lao notes that demand for medical services is more 
inelastic than that for rides, giving doctors more market power than 
drivers.251 Thus, Professor Lao concludes that drivers in ride-sharing 
 
 245. Lao, supra note 151, at 1563–65. 
 246. Id. at 1571–72. 
 247. Id. at 1565–66 (footnotes omitted). 
 248. Id. at 1567. 
 249. Id. at 1568–69. Cf. Kim, supra note 17, 435–40 (identifying income disparities as a 
justification for antitrust exceptions). One challenge to the income disparity argument is that the 
characteristics of sharing economy workers are not uniform. See generally BD. OF GOVERNORS OF 
THE FED. RSRV. SYS., supra note 3, at 18–20. 
 250. Lao, supra note 151, at 1569. 
 251. Id. at 1570–73. 
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enterprises should be given an exemption from the Sherman Act 
because they are subject to more control than the actors in the other 
situations and are poorer than doctors.252  
Professor Lao views the question of whether sharing economy 
workers should be allowed to jointly negotiate as one of sacrificing the 
procompetition policy of the Sherman Act for the economic benefit of 
sharing economy workers. She is willing to extend the labor exemption 
to achieve that goal. The clearest limitation on Lao’s approach is its 
failure to accommodate differing facts regarding market dynamics 
based on geography. This risks trading off harm to workers against 
harm to consumers in a way the solution outlined in this Article does 
not.253  
2. Replacing the Common Law “Control” Test with a Market Realities 
Test 
Eric Posner takes issue with the control test for employment, 
developed at common law and adopted by statute, to establish the 
divide between those entitled to employment protections, including 
collective bargaining.254 Arguing that “contractor or employee status, 
properly understood, depends on market structure—whether workers 
operate in a competitive labor market or not,”255 Professor Posner 
outlines the economic difference between employment and contracting 
as a distinction between labor markets better characterized as 
competitive from those better characterized as monopsonistic.256 The 
character of the market, in turn, is influenced by the nature of the work, 
whether it is “discrete” or “relational.”257  
The more discrete the work, the easier it is for the worker to find 
alternative buyers willing to bid for services, and therefore the less 
monopsony power enjoyed by any one buyer with whom the worker  
does business.258 In contrast, work that is highly relational reflects  
buyer-specific investments by the worker, whether it be particular tools, 
education, skills, or licensure.259 The relationship-specific investment 
ties the worker to the employment relationship and makes alternative 
 
 252. Id. at 1573. 
 253. Section IV.B argues that in some circumstances allowing sharing economy workers to 
jointly negotiate furthers the underlying Sherman Act policies. See infra Section IV.B. 
 254. Posner, supra note 183, at 3–4.  
 255. Id. at 3. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. at 4. 
 258. Id. at 9–10. 
 259. Id. 
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buyers less attractive to the particular worker.260 This fact gives the 
buyer some degree of monopsony power.261 The effect is that the 
contractor, the worker engaged in discrete work, can rely on market 
forces for basic employment protections including wages and benefits, 
while the employee, the worker engaged in relational work, cannot.262 
Posner applies this economic lens—which, he argues, describes the 
economic relationship in labor markets better than the common-law 
“control” test—to the question of legal regulation of the labor market, 
with a specific focus on minimum wage laws.263  
As Professor Posner recognizes, the same argument applies to 
the question of bargaining rights.264 In the case of discrete work, 
workers amply protected by market forces should be precluded from 
collective bargaining, which would have the effect of establishing a 
monopoly labor price, reducing output, and thereby harming 
consumers.265 In contrast, workers performing relational work bear 
significant opportunity costs in pursuing other buyers for their labor, 
and the extent of these opportunity costs coincides with the amount of 
bargaining power the buyer has over them. Permitting these workers 
to bargain collectively, thus giving countervailing monopoly power, can 
shift the price paid closer to the theoretical competitive equilibrium.266 
By thus bringing workers into the market to invest in and perform this 
relational work, the buyer’s output is increased and consumers 
benefit.267  
Finally, Professor Posner engages the difficult intersection 
between worker protections either through regulation or bargaining 
and antitrust law, which in ordinary cases objects to aggregating power 
at any one level of a distribution chain—whether among workers  
or buyers of labor.268 He reaches the necessary conclusion that 
organization by sharing economy workers who are contractors violates 
Section 1, while organization among employees is immunized by the 
labor exemption.269 His analysis falls short when he critiques the 
argument that if sharing economy suppliers are not permitted to 
 
 260. Id. at 4. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 16. 
 263. Id. at 14–16.  
 264. Cf. id. at 16 (“Employment law and labor law counter labor monopsony, which should 
generate wealth.”). 
 265. Id. at 15. 
 266. Id. 
 267. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 268. Posner, supra note 183, at 22–24. 
 269. Id. at 23; cf. supra Section II.A. 
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combine for purposes of setting prices, the platform should not be 
permitted to do so either.270 Professor Posner argues that “lawsuits 
against Uber for cartelizing the market have failed because Uber faces 
competition” and driver price fixing without market power would 
violate the Sherman Act “only because of the crude per se ban on price 
fixing.”271 The first proposition misstates the resolution of lawsuits 
against Uber in US federal courts, which are dismissed due to 
competition only in the case of a monopolization claim.272 The second 
proposition too hastily rejects the value of per se rules in ensuring ease 
of administrability for challenges to conduct with obvious harm and 
limited or no social value. Section IV.B, argues that avoiding the 
application of the per se rule to joint negotiation by sharing economy 
workers requires greater justification than merely rejecting per se 
rules.  
Professor Posner’s application of his economic lens to the 
circumstance of sharing economy workers is necessarily stylized and 
does not provide a satisfying resolution of the labor rights-antitrust 
conflict the sharing economy presents. The observation that  
“[g]ig-economy workers float somewhere between the traditional 
employee and the traditional contractor”273 is an effective shorthand, 
which explains legislative efforts around the globe toward a third 
classification, as well as Professor Lao’s suggestion for uncoupling labor 
law from state employment law.274 It is unclear that this approach is 
generalizable across sharing economy enterprises, however. It also may 
ignore important distinctions among workers in any one enterprise. The 
structured analysis in Section IV.B builds on Professor Posner’s 
economic lens and his challenge to the control test, while attempting a 
more nuanced treatment of the circumstance of organizing by workers 
on sharing economy enterprises. 
 
 270. Posner, supra note 183, at 23 (critiquing Sanjukta M. Paul, Uber as For-Profit Hiring 
Hall: A Price-Fixing Paradox and Its Implications, 38 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 233, 236–39 
(2017)); cf. Anderson & Huffman, supra note 1, at 862 (Uber agreement reflects a hub-and-spoke 
cartel in the absence of a unilateral conduct argument). 
 271. Posner, supra note 183, at 23. 
 272. See, e.g., Desoto Cab. Co. v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-cv-06385-JSW, slip op. at 5–8 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2020) (dismissing predation claims against Uber due to the plaintiff’s failure 
to sufficiently allege a monopoly position). 
 273. Posner, supra note 183, at 21. 
 274. See IUS LABORIS, THE BYWORD: THE GIG ECONOMY 8–9 (2018), https://iuslaboris-as-
sets.s3.amazonaws.com/media/filer_public/9f/d5/9fd5b984-cb21-42fb-8445-cb0a28eedc2a/iusla-
boris_the_byword_the_gig_economy_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/86M8-TQ7U]; Lao, supra note 151, 
at 1583–86; see also supra Section IV.A.1. 
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3. Cooperative Oversight Between Antitrust and Labor Agencies 
Hiba Hafiz acknowledges the connection between labor market 
buyer power and harms felt in the consumer market but argues that, 
empirically, this connection does not play out in most cases.275 
“[C]ommentators concede that prices to consumers will not increase” 
from exercises of labor market monopsony power “if product markets 
are competitive or when ‘reduced sales . . . will be offset’ by new firms’ 
sales.”276 The possibility (and empirical frequency) of wage 
discrimination also allows exercises of monopsony power without 
reducing labor inputs, thus not affecting output or prices to 
consumers.277 In Part III, the Authors analyze these realities in the 
context of the sharing economy and ride-sharing specifically.278  
Because of this empirical reality, a purely consumer-focused 
antitrust law is unlikely to protect against monopsony power in labor 
markets. Professor Hafiz identifies places where enforcement may 
operate to the benefit of workers, including in the context of horizontal 
agreements with clear impacts on wages or worker movement.279 Other 
instances, including mergers and labor market restraints not subject to 
the per se rule, are ambiguous concerning likely enforcement decisions 
and litigation outcomes.280 Professor Hafiz identifies examples of 
monopsony conduct in labor markets that are permitted based on 
benefits to consumers.281 Additionally, “when labor market restraints 
benefit workers and not consumers, the consumer welfare standard 
trumps.”282  
Professor Hafiz suggests a regulatory-sharing approach in 
which the National Labor Relations Board and the Department of Labor 
would share responsibility for antitrust review of mergers, which under 
current law is conducted by either the Justice Department or Federal 
Trade Commission without input from the Department of Labor.283 The 
labor agencies would serve a fact-finding function and would have 
power separately to review efficiency defenses.284 Under Professor 
Hafiz’s approach, the labor agencies would follow a public interest 
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standard, akin to that followed by other agencies with concurrent 
jurisdiction over sector-specific mergers.285 Most pertinent to the labor 
market problems in sharing economy enterprises, Professor Hafiz 
argues that the classification of workers as contractors or employees 
should take into account monopsony power held by buyers of labor 
inputs.286 
Among the three approaches outlined here, Hafiz’s approach 
does the least to alter existing substantive legal standards and theories 
of antitrust law. A consultative role and concurrent oversight authority 
by labor agencies of conduct and mergers implicating worker interests 
would permit antitrust to operate, and the law to develop, as it 
currently does. It would only require additional cooperation among 
agencies, with the most likely impact being a slowdown of the oversight 
function. In the context of mergers, this may present particular 
concerns. The most potent critique of Professor Hafiz’s approach is its 
failure to acknowledge the political challenges inherent in agency 
cooperation. An important difference with the cooperation suggested 
here is the divergent goals of the agencies’ work. One might expect 
substantial conflict to arise, ultimately requiring courts to determine 
which approach to favor in a particular case. In this way, Hafiz’s 
argument may be thought to offer little improvement over pure 
incorporation of divergent goals through the common-law process. 
Professor Hafiz seeks to address the potential tension between 
the interests of consumers and workers by allocating differing 
responsibilities to antitrust and labor law and authorities. Antitrust 
would advance the interests of consumers and labor law would advance 
the interests of workers. Section IV.B argues that the interests of 
consumers and workers are consistent when the buyer of workers’ 
services has monopsony power. It also analyzes when such monopsony 
power is likely to exist in the sharing economy context. 
In summary, Professors Lao, Posner, and Hafiz use different 
approaches to examine the potential tension between the interests of 
consumers and workers. They each turn to the labor exemption or labor 
law to answer the question. Professor Lao concludes that the labor 
exemption should apply to sharing economy workers to advance their 
interest. Professor Posner concludes that the labor exemption is 
consistent with consumer interests since it allows workers to overcome 
monopsony power of buyers of labor. Professor Hafiz concludes that 
labor law should collaborate with antitrust law, with labor law pursuing 
workers’ interests and antitrust law pursuing consumer interests. 
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Section IV.B argues that the Sherman Act’s Rule of Reason should be 
used to permit joint negotiation by sharing economy workers when it is 
consistent with the interests of consumers. 
B. Harnessing the Rule of Reason to Protect Some Sharing Economy 
Workers 
This Section identifies two possible understandings of the 
market for ride-share driving. In the first, which this Article calls the 
fallow-assets model of the market, the predominant suppliers have the 
option to enter and exit at their leisure. The effect is that at higher labor 
prices the output of driving services would be higher and at lower prices 
the output would be lower, represented by the classic upward-sloping 
supply curve for labor. A single buyer of labor in this market has some 
degree of monopsony power, enabling it to reduce the price for labor and 
accept the reduced output. In the second, which this Article calls the 
locked-in model of the market, the predominant suppliers have made 
irrevocable commitments to their work in ride-sharing. In this market, 
higher prices may bring others into the market, increasing output, but 
lower prices would not necessarily reduce output—in fact, below a 
break-even price point, lower prices may increase output as locked-in 
drivers work to ensure they can meet expenses. This C-shaped supply 
curve ensures the monopsonist buyer of driving services has 
extraordinary monopsony power, enabling it to reduce prices for labor 
substantially.287   
The effect of these two exercises of monopoly power on 
consumers differs. With an upward-sloping supply curve more 
characteristic of ordinary input markets, the reduced labor price 
reduces output, in turn reducing output and raising the price in 
consumer markets. In this market, collective action by drivers that 
pushed the price for labor back toward the competitive equilibrium 
would increase output both in the labor and in the consumer markets.  
In contrast, with a C-shaped supply curve, which is near vertical 
at some price point and downward sloping at lower prices, the effect of 
organization by drivers in the locked-in market to raise prices depends 
on where in the range prices are in the absence of organization. At very 
low prices, below the break-even point for locked-in drivers, an increase 
would reduce output, as overworked drivers take advantage of the 
ability to experience leisure time after reaching their earnings 
threshold. At this low end of the price range, the effect of organization 
to increase prices would be to increase price and reduce output for 
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consumers. In the middle of the price range, a price increase would not 
impact output meaningfully because the vertical supply curve implies 
price insensitivity for drivers covering costs.288 In this range, the effect 
of organization would be to increase prices and reduce output in the 
consumer market. Finally, at a high enough price point, the effect in the 
locked-in market would mirror the effect in the fallow-assets market, 
as drivers increase output, incentivized by higher prices. Like in the 
fallow assets case, in this range, collective action would benefit 
consumers by increasing output and reducing prices to consumers. 
Intuition suggests that across the realistic price ranges for ride-share 
driving, locked-in markets would see worker interests and consumer 
interests in tension, rather than in concert. 
The divergent effects on consumers of an agreement among 
drivers, depending on which model of the market prevails, could impact 
the answers to at least three legal questions under Section 1. First, 
should an agreement among drivers to jointly negotiate with the 
platform company be per se illegal? Second, would a plaintiff asserting 
a claim against the drivers under the Rule of Reason satisfy its 
threshold burden to show the likelihood of anticompetitive effects 
quickly, without a thorough analysis of the market? Third, if a plaintiff 
makes such a showing, would the possible pro-consumer outcome of an 
agreement among the drivers if traditional monopsony power is 
present, constitute a procompetitive justification available to the 
drivers under the second question of the Rule of Reason?  
1. Is the Drivers’ Agreement Per Se Illegal? 
As Section II.A demonstrates, it is ordinarily easy to conclude 
that an agreement among competitors affecting price is per se illegal. 
In ordinary circumstances, such an agreement raising prices reduces 
output and hurts consumers. However, the Supreme Court has 
sometimes declined to apply the per se rule to horizontal agreements 
directly or indirectly impacting price. In both Professional Engineers289 
and Board of Regents,290 the Court declined to apply the per se rule to a 
no-bid agreement and an output restriction, both of which could  
be expected to raise the price of the services. Likewise, in Broadcast  
Music Inc. v. CBS,291 the Court interpreted a blanket license offered by 
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competing performing artists, which stated that an agreed price point 
for respective music offerings was not a per se illegal price fix.292 
The per se rule against price fixing is aimed at agreements that 
reduce output and hurt consumers. An assertion that drivers’ joint 
negotiation with the platforms would increase output and reduce prices 
to consumers by overcoming the output-reducing effects of monopsony 
power is aimed at the theoretical core of this rule. If the drivers’ 
agreement could increase output, leading to an output increase and 
commensurate price decrease in the consumer market, there is a good 
argument that the per se rule should not apply. 
In deciding whether a per se rule should apply, the Supreme 
Court has focused on two criteria. First, per se rules should be invoked 
only when the restraints being assessed would almost always be found 
to be anticompetitive upon further scrutiny:  
Resort to per se rules is confined to restraints . . . “that would always or almost  
always tend to restrict competition and decrease output” . . . To justify a per se 
prohibition a restraint must have “manifestly anticompetitive” effects . . . and  
“lack . . . any redeeming virtue.”293 
A drivers’ agreement to jointly negotiate with the platform 
companies might decrease output or it might increase output, 
depending on the nature of the market in question and in particular 
whether the supply curve is upward sloping, vertical, or downward 
sloping in the relevant range.294 Under a plausible, and likely extant in 
some geographical areas, model of the labor market in ride-sharing, the 
drivers’ agreement could lead to a procompetitive increase in output. 
Thus, the per se rule should not apply to driver organizing behavior. 
A second criterion the Court considers in deciding whether to 
apply a rule of per se illegality is the extent of experience courts have 
with restraints of this type. “[T]he per se rule is appropriate only after 
courts have had considerable experience with the type of restraint at 
issue . . . and only if courts can predict with confidence that it would be 
invalidated in all or almost all instances under the rule of reason.”295 Of 
course, a drivers’ agreement to jointly negotiate with the platforms 
would arise in the context of the sharing economy, which the Authors 
have described as disrupting existing commercial structures in 
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meaningful, and not fully understood, ways.296 Due to the novelty of the 
sharing economy, courts continue to have very little experience 
applying the Sherman Act to these relationships. This lack of 
experience urges caution in applying per se rules. 
This Article has demonstrated that organization by ride-share 
drivers is not protected by the labor exemption from antitrust and 
would under traditional antitrust doctrine represent a per se illegal 
price fix.297 However, unique features of the ride-sharing labor market 
and its impact on consumers renders the per se rule a bad fit for this 
industry, likely to produce an intolerable level of false positives in the 
presence of uncertainty about the actual effects of labor market 
organization. 
2. Would a Plaintiff Satisfy Its Initial Burden Under the Rule of 
Reason Quickly? 
In the absence of the simple per se rule, the complex  
burden-shifting analysis of the Rule of Reason would be invoked. The 
threshold question under the Rule of Reason is whether the plaintiff 
can demonstrate a likelihood that the challenged agreement has 
anticompetitive effects.298 In both Board of Regents and Professional 
Engineers, the Court concluded that the plaintiff had made such a 
showing without engaging in a thorough analysis of the market, 
establishing the quick look Rule of Reason. Prior scholarship has 
argued that the hub-and-spoke agreement among the platform and 
ride-share drivers was appropriately considered under the quick look 
approach.299 That agreement touches on the most competitively 
sensitive of transaction terms—price—and is directed at the consumer 
market. It is not a per se illegal price fix because the agreement 
supports the existence of ride-sharing as a business model, enabling 
instantaneous contracting without real-time negotiation.300  
An agreement among competing drivers aimed at increasing the 
price of their services, likewise targeting the most competitively 
sensitive of transaction terms, might seem to be worthy of quick look 
treatment under the first question of the Rule of Reason for the same 
reason that the platforms’ agreements with ride-share drivers are. 
However, in the analogous case of California Dental,301 the Supreme 
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Court declined to apply the quick look approach. The Commission 
alleged that the dental association had restricted truthful advertising 
regarding prices and quality. The Ninth Circuit had applied the quick 
look approach in condemning the agreement.302 The Supreme Court 
reversed since it thought that the quick look approach applied in Board 
of Regents and Professional Engineers put too lenient a burden on the 
plaintiff.303 Justice Souter’s majority opinion noted that the advertising 
restrictions might have procompetitive effects by avoiding misleading 
advertising.304 He also acknowledged that the restrictions might have 
anticompetitive effects.305 The ambiguity of outcomes precluded a quick 
look approach to the threshold question of the Rule of Reason. “[T]he 
plausibility of competing claims about the effects of the professional 
advertising restrictions rules out the indulgently abbreviated review to 
which the Commission’s order was treated. The obvious anticompetitive 
effect that triggers abbreviated analysis has not been shown.”306 Given 
competing claims about the effects of the agreement, the plaintiff bore 
the burden of a more thorough market analysis, demonstrating the 
conduct presented a likelihood of harm to consumers.307 
In light of the two equally plausible states of the labor market  
in question and the uncertainty regarding which state prevails in a 
particular geographic market, an agreement among drivers in  
ride-sharing enterprises to jointly negotiate with the platform company 
could be subject to a similar analysis. As in California Dental, there are 
two possibilities concerning the competitive effects of the agreement. In 
a locked-in model, over the most likely price range, the vertical or 
downward-sloping supply curve implies joint negotiation to raise prices 
would reduce output and raise prices in the labor market, ultimately 
harming consumers. In a fallow-assets model, characterized by the 
classic upward-sloping supply curve, the agreement could counteract 
the effects of monopsony power, thereby raising labor prices, increasing 
labor output, and leading to an output increase in the consumer market.   
The crucial question distinguishing the quick look from the “full 
blown Rule of Reason” is who bears the burden of resolving this 
question.308 In California Dental, a similar uncertainty as to the effect 
on consumers from observed conduct was present. The Court held that 
the burden was on the plaintiff to address this question under the first 
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step of the Rule of Reason. The allocation of the burden is important 
since, as in California Dental, the facts might make the question hard 
to resolve.309 In such a circumstance, the party bearing the burden will 
lose in the presence of uncertainty. 
As a practical matter, bearing this burden would require a 
plaintiff to challenge collective action by ride-sharing workers to 
establish key facts about the nature of the market. Whether the 
plaintiff is the platform, a government enforcer, or possibly a class of 
consumers,310 the Rule of Reason would require that plaintiff to show 
that labor organization threatens increased prices or reduced output in 
the consumer market. This, in turn, requires a showing of the nature of 
the labor market and the likely effect on output from an increased price 
for labor. In the presence of uncertainty, this is a heavy burden. 
3. If the Burden Shifts to the Drivers, What Is the Nature of the 
Burden? 
The second question under the Rule of Reason would be whether  
the drivers could point to a procompetitive justification for their 
agreement.311 The drivers would assert the possibility of procompetitive 
effects from an agreement counteracting a platform’s exercise of 
monopsony power. A procompetitive effect from this agreement would 
be to increase the output of labor and thereby increase output in the 
consumer market. The practical requirement would be, in effect, to 
counteract the market analysis required of the plaintiff, demonstrating 
the market in this case saw or would see, increased labor output in 
response to a price increase.  
The exact nature of the burden on the defendant drivers is 
important. Do the drivers bear the burden of persuasion on this 
question, or merely a burden of producing evidence? Here an agreement 
among drivers may have procompetitive effects or anticompetitive 
effects, depending on whether the supply curve for driving is upward 
sloping or downward sloping in the relevant range, which is itself a 
challenging fact to establish. Do the drivers need to persuade the trier 
of fact that the drivers’ agreement is overcoming platform monopsony 
power to the benefit of consumers? Alternatively, do the drivers merely 
need to produce evidence that this is occurring? 
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The exact nature of the burden on the defendants for the second 
question of the Rule of Reason is uncertain. Professor Hovenkamp 
defines this burden as one of producing evidence: “If the defendant is 
unable to defeat the prima facie case and offers no justification, then 
the plaintiff is entitled to prevail. By contrast, if the defendant does 
provide evidence of a procompetitive justification the burden may shift 
a second time.”312 Another source interprets Board of Regents to impose 
a higher burden of persuasion, rather than mere production in some 
circumstances.313 Because Board of Regents involved inherently 
problematic conduct and subjected it to the quick look, the better 
approach to the full-blown Rule of Reason is that articulated by 
Professor Hovenkamp. The effect is to impose a relatively light 
obligation on ride-share drivers defending a claim for organizing to 
show the possibility of procompetitive effects from that organization. 
The analysis here leads to an important and somewhat 
uncomfortable conclusion. The market-structure scenario that leads to 
the conclusion that procompetitive effects are likely is the fallow-asset 
model, with its upward-sloping supply curve. In such a market, an 
agreement among drivers would counteract monopsony power, raise 
price, and increase output in the labor market, leading to a reasonable 
likelihood of consumer benefit. The Rule of Reason could identify these 
cases and legalize the agreement among drivers. However, these are 
least likely to be the workers in real need of labor organization, in light 
of their economic choices. 
In contrast, in the locked-in model, no such procompetitive effect 
would flow from a drivers’ agreement to jointly negotiate if prices are in 
a low range. In the locked-in scenario, the supply curve, over the range 
of prices expected to prevail, is vertical or downward sloping. An 
agreement among the drivers to jointly negotiate could increase  
price, but that would lead to a decrease, or perhaps no change, in  
labor-market output. This reduction in output could be expected to hurt 
consumers. Therefore, the Rule of Reason would condemn an agreement 
among locked-in drivers, who have the fewest economic choices. This 
leaves the necessity of regulatory interventions in the form of  
wage-and-hour and other protections that exist for employees 
throughout the economy.314 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 For more than a century, courts have interpreted the Sherman 
Act to apply to an economy constantly transforming in response to 
changes in technology and business structures. In doing so, courts have 
been informed by an evolving understanding of the economics of 
different relationships among market participants. The focus of this 
process has been on the welfare of consumers. The categorical 
approaches of the per se rules and the matter of degree approach of the 
Rule of Reason, with its shifting burdens, have been the primary tools 
in this process. Occasionally, Congress has altered the results of this 
judicial process by creating exemptions from the Sherman Act such as 
the labor exemption. The creation of the sharing economy has posed 
major challenges for this process of evolution. The law is only beginning 
to respond to these challenges. 
As workers in the sharing economy look to the possibility of 
jointly negotiating with sharing economy platform companies for better 
compensation, the legal structures created for participants in 
traditional firms pose grave risks for the workers. Such joint 
negotiations look like a price-fixing cartel of suppliers subject to the per 
se rule against price fixing by competitors. Even if the per se rule does 
not apply, the joint negotiations look illegal under the quick look version 
of the Rule of Reason. If the sharing economy workers try to raise the 
shield of the labor exemption, they are met with the likely conclusion 
that they are independent contractors, not employees, and are therefore 
not exempt. 
However, courts have long been open to new understandings of 
the economics underlying the antitrust laws. This is especially the case 
in new enterprise structures, like those in the sharing economy. Cartels 
are treated harshly because they hurt consumers by raising prices and 
reducing output. If a monopsonist buyer of labor has reduced output in 
an effort to lower the prices it pays for labor, consumers could be hurt 
by that reduction in output. An agreement among workers could raise 
their compensation which would increase output and help consumers. 
This applies both to employees and to workers in the sharing economy. 
How should the law take this into account for workers in the sharing 
economy? One possibility is to extend the labor exemption to sharing 
economy workers. Another is to use the Rule of Reason.  
In the case of sharing economy workers who are drivers for  
ride-sharing enterprises, there are two models of drivers. In the  
fallow-assets model, drivers have not made a relationship-specific 
investment in their car. They own the car for other purposes and use it 
to supplement their income by driving. By contrast, in the locked-in 
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model, drivers bought the car to drive for the ride-sharing enterprise. 
This relationship-specific investment has important ramifications. 
Locked-in drivers need to drive enough to pay for their car expenses, as 
well as their other living expenses. Fallow-asset drivers have typical 
reactions to compensation. They are incentivized to drive more when 
price is high than when it is low. Therefore, when a monopsonist buyer 
lowers price, quantity goes down. This reduction in quantity can injure 
consumers. On the other hand, locked-in drivers have a different 
response to reductions in price. They cannot drive less, since they need 
to make the payments on the car that they bought so they could be 
drivers for the platform (as well as their other expenses). In response to 
a price reduction by a powerful seller, the locked-in driver will not drive 
less, and might drive more. Therefore, there is not quantity reduction 
to hurt consumers. 
The differing reactions by fallow-asset drivers and locked-in 
drivers to price reductions by powerful buyers has important 
implications for how the law should respond to agreements among 
drivers designed to increase their compensation by jointly negotiating 
with platform companies. Such a joint negotiation agreement among 
fallow-asset drivers could increase price toward the competitive level. 
This higher price would lead to an increase in quantity produced, 
serving to benefit consumers. However, an agreement among locked-in 
drivers designed to increase their compensation could reduce quantity 
and hurt consumers. A consumer-oriented antitrust law should allow 
the agreement among fallow-asset drivers and condemn the agreement 
among locked-in drivers. A structured application of the Rule of Reason 
could accomplish this set of outcomes. However, how should the law 
deal with uncertainty about whether fallow-asset drivers or locked-in 
drivers predominate at the margin in any particular geographic 
market? The burden-shifting structure of the Rule of Reason answers 
this question by imposing the initial burden of characterizing the 
market on a plaintiff challenging an agreement among drivers. This is 
a substantial burden. 
This analysis leaves open the possibility that a plaintiff 
challenging an agreement among drivers might successfully establish 
that the predominate drivers at the margin in the market are locked-in 
and that the agreement has reduced quantity to the detriment of 
consumers. In such a case, the Rule of Reason would conclude that the 
agreement is illegal. This conclusion is potentially troubling for reasons 
unrelated to a consumer-focused antitrust law. Locked-in drivers are 
locked in because they are economically disadvantaged. For an 
antitrust law focused on consumers, this is irrelevant. However, society 
has other values. Achieving those values across the entirety of the  
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ride-sharing labor market will require some alternative solution, which 
might emerge by legislation or by aggressive extension of the labor 
exemption through the common-law process. 
